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I . MAIN ASPECTS 
1.,Outline 
Besides discussing the role of the private sector and its repercussions 
on the public sector, most studies ou the mobilization of domestic resources 
examine the more traditional functions of the public sector, namely, those 
that have to do with revenue and expenditure. Consequently, any discussion 
of the subject tends to centre on the classic questions of fiscal policy 
(the nature of public income, the composition of expenditure, etc.) while 
generally relegating the part played by public enterprises to the background, 
or omitting it altogether. This may well be because, as a,rule, they are 
seen as the backbone of the infrastructure or as suppliers, as aids to the 
production of other enterprisesj instances where they actually generate 
profits tend to be looked upon as exceptions or anomalies. Even in the 
over-all planning process i t is quite common for the public enterprise 
sector not to be taken explicitly into account: most medium-term plans 
prepared in Latin American countries, for instance, refer only to investment 
by the central government and fai l to give a sufficiently detailed breakdown 
of investment by public enterprises./ Considering the size of these enterprises, 
in terms of capital, sales volume and staff, and their effect on the 
accumulation of resources, which is partly reflected in their fixed investment, 
and especially considering, in addition t@ such quantitative data, their 
influence in decisive sectors of the econongr, this approach is quite 
unjustified. The importance of public enterprises is increased further by 
their ability to serve as agents of a development policy, i . e . , their 
fole in capital formation, their links with the world of technology and 
with the capital goods industries, and their potential co-ordination and 




These are some of the outstanding features of public enterprises 
which this rough preliminary study will attempt to explore. It is a new 
addition to the series of studies on the public sector and on the 
mobilization $f domestic resources that was started some years ago.- This 
somewhat ambitious project comes up against the hitherto unsolved problem 
of the scarcity of data and the fact that many of those that do exist are 
not comparable; for this reason and because i t is a practica], impossibility 
to include all public enterprises, only the largest firms in selected countries 
will be dealt with here* The study, however, is s t i l l valid despite the 
shortage of information since i t does not attempt to give a comprehensive 
and detailed picture of public enterprises, but only to provide a few pointers 
to their significance and functions and to pose a certain number of problems 
and questions. Furthermore, there is no attempt to establish positions of 
principle or make practical recommendations, but only to help towards a 
better understanding of this sector of the ecpnomy. It is , moreover, the 
f i rst study on this subject and i t is hoped that i t will serve as a basis. 
j for a more extensive and detailed future analysis. 
2 . Origin of public enterprises 
I f events1 followed a logical course, government enterprises would be 
selected in accordance with the basic criteria of economic policy and would 
operate in a coherent manner» In theory, the State would take over and 
administer certain carefully chosen activities on the principle that private 
enterprise does not guarantee - and, in extreme cases, actually goes against — 
the common good or the execution of specific policies, thereby ensuring 
compatibility of. aims and a co-ordinated plan for activities in which the 
public interest was directly involved. Thus, the setting up of a public 
1/ See EGLA, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1955 j pp. 111-176, on 
government income and expenditure during the period 1947-1954; Economic 
Survey for Latin America. 1967. pp. 100-118, on tax'financing; and 
Economic Survey for Latin America. 1968 pp. 101-109, on the public 
sector» In addition, a document on the mobilization of domestic resources 
(E/CNè12/827) was presented to the thirteenth session of the Commission 




enterprise or the taking over of a private enterprise by the State would be 
orderly and systematic and would imply the fulfilment of certain fundamental 
conditions. But this has not been so in practice. As a rule, i t has not 
been the government that has decided beforehand, in the light of the needs 
of the economy, just what existing or future enterprises should be State-
owned; on the contrary, there is great diversity among public enterprises 
as regards articles and services produced, quality, size, age and origin. 
As this diversity is largely responsible for their lack of co-ordination, 
i t is worth considering how these have been brought under State control, 
examining f i rs t the procedure adopted and then the function they have fulf i l led 
at the various stages of Latin America1 s economic development., 
(a) The f irst category comprises public utility enterprises that have 
traditionally operated under State supervision or direct State control, 
especially those connected with-transport and energy. In some cases, the 
State has b^en responsible for these activities from the start; in others, 
i t took over from private concerns after a certain period. In the case of 
the Argentine railways, for instance, the f i rst railway company, Ferrocarril 
del Oeste, which started operating in 1857, was originally privately owned; 
i t was turned over to the Province of Buenos Aires in 1862, bought in 1890 
with British capital, and was finally nationalized in 1948, along with all 
the other railway companies. Another example is Chile's electricity supply, 
which used t o be in the hands o f a privrte company, Chilectra - nationalized in 
1970 ~ and a public enterprise, ENDESA, which generated 41 and 58 per cent 
of the national total respectively in I968. The Brazilian telecommunications 
system is a third case in point; finding that the company's equipment was 
out-of-date and needed at least a million more telephones, the State took 
over the Brazilian Traction Company in,l966, which became the Brazilian 
Telephone Company, and set up EMBRATEL, a public enterprise responsible for 
2/ the inter-state long-distance communications system.— 
2/ See Ministerio de Plañejamento e Coordenajao, Programa estratégico de 
desenvolvimento, Area estratégica IIIi Infraestrutura. III Comunicacoes, 
draft versión* 1968, pp. 4 etoseq. 
A s VJill 
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As will be seen below, virtually al l railway services and most power 
companies are currently under State control. 
(b) The government has taken over other activities or established new 
enterprises to assist in the execution of economic policies or plans 
necessitating government management in certain strategic areas. 
This has been done in two different ways« One involves carrying out 
a specific activity along different lines from those that would be followed 
by a private enterprise, or tapping the resources generated by such an 
enterprise for public investment projects. This is what happened when the 
Bolivian tin mines were nationalized, partly out of a desir© for greater 
independence and partly because of the need to use the resources they 
generated, A recent document published by the Bolivian Government recalls how, 
during the Second World War, Bolivia was forced by i ts economic dependence to 
agree to the freezing of the price of tin at a level which was unilaterally 
fixed by foreign interests. The document goes on to say that naturally the 
mining enterprises themselves did not suffer from this arrangement, as they 
possessed enough political power to be able to use their profits to finance 
projects abroad and were powerful enough in Bolivia to evade any taxes 
3/ 
designed to keep a share of their profits in the country.— It is interesting 
to note how these resources were channelled and used after nationalization. 
The Bolivian mining corporation (Corporación Minera de Bolivia - COMIBOL) 
was forced to sel l the foreign exchange earned .from its. t in exports to .the. 
Central Bank at a low exchange rate, and the resources were used to keep 
down the prices of essential imports and for investment in other sectors of 
the economy, both public and private» 
The second way is to create new enterprises. Once the enterprise i s 
established, the State continues to control i t , sets up a mixed company or 
sells i t to private investors. The decisions that have been adopted have 
depended on the aim the State had in view when i t established the enterprise 
and the prevailing trends in Government economic pelicy at the time, 
2 / See Ministerio de Plane jamen to e Coordinayao, Estrategia socio-
económica del desarrollo nacional. 1971-1991. vol. I , page 38. 
/A typical 
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A typical example of this approach is provided by the Chilean production 
development corporation (Corporación de Fomento de la Producción - CORFO), 
which is a government agency set up in 1939 for the purpose of formulating 
an over-all development plan for the Chilean economy» In the initial stage i t 
was decided to formulate sectoral plans since there were certain obvious 
priorities, and studies were carried out to determine the potentialities and 
deficiencies of each sector; and not only that - machinery was set up for 
practical action to promote sectoral development, CORFO organized enterprises 
in which i t had a majority or minority interest, such as the electricity company 
(ENDESA 1944-1945), the steel company (CAP, 1946), the petroleum company 
(ENAP, 1950), the beet sugar company (IANSA, 1952), the hotel consortium and 
HONSA (1944 and 1945)> the network of refrigerating plants (from 1948 
onwards), the telecommunications company (ENTEL, 1964), and the fishing 
industry. In the case of industry, i t bought shares and provided technical 
assistance to enterprises producing iron and steel, fisheries products, pulp 
and paper, electronic equipment, chemicals, petrochemicals and metal products. 
It also set up support organizations such as the natural resources research 
institute (Instituto de Investigaciones de Recursos Naturales - IREN), the 
Chilean technological institute, the national vocational training institute 
(instituto Nacional de Capacitación Profesional - INACAP), the computer 
services enterprise, the costs institute and the technical co-operation 
service. Lastly, CORFO drew up the national programme of economic development, 
I96I-I97O, the basic purpose for which i t was created. Previously, i t had 
femulated developnent policies for industry, agriculture and commerce. Thus, 
in industry, from 1944 
onwards, CORFO supplied financing and guaranteed the 
operations of private enterprises, besides being a share-holder in some 
enterprises, as mentioned above; in agriculture, i t provided capital for 
irrigation and drainage, improved livestock breeding, etp.; in commerce, i t 
took action to keep the market steady at crucial moments, and as part of i ts 
normal activities supplied some dairy and fish products. In short, CORFO 
currently owns shares in more than eighty enterprises, and institutes of 
widely differing kinds (see table 9 below). 
(c) A third method is for the State to take over activities as a 
result of confiscation. This has been the case for the property of enterprises /or citizens 
K/CN,12/872 
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or citizens of countries at war, which were nationalized temporarily or 
permanently (e.go, German property during the Second World War), and for 
the property of persons or enterprises expropriated by the government for 
various reasons« 
An example is the setting up of the corporation of State enterprises 
(Corporación Dominicana de Empresas Estatales - CORDE) in the Dominican 
Republicj in 1961 these enterprises passed under the control of the industrial 
development corporation, which in July 1966 became CORDE, In addition, the 
hotel corporation and the Dominican sugar company were created; the sugar 
company took over all the nationalised sugar mills and later became the 
State sugar council (Consejo Estatal del Azúcar), By 1962, the Dominican 
electricity corporation, which was purchased in 1955,- had been nationalized* 
CORDE is the owner of or a share-holder in forty-eight enterprises; in the 
industrial sector i t is the owner of eight enterprises, has a majority interest 
in thirteen others and a minority interest in nine; i t owns one agricultural 
enterprise; i t owns one mining enterprise and is a minority share-holder in 
another; lastly, i t has a controlling interest in nine commercial enterprises 
and a minority share in six others. Of these enterprises, nine are monopolies, 
two have a joint monopoly and the rest compete with the private sector (see 
table E of the appendix to this chapter), 
CORDE is not in the same position as CORFO, since i t is basically 
responsible for managing a group of enterprises that were confiscated and whose 
nature had not previously been determined, 
(d) Lastly, there are cases of emergency nationalization, where the 
State buys enterprises which cannot be kept going by private enterprise. In 
some such cases, the State has acted to ensure the continued supply of certain 
services or inputs that are essential to the community, and in others i t has 
supported the enterprises, taken over responsibility for their losses and 
acquired a share in their capital. An example that immediately springs to 
mind is the nationalization of railways in countries where they were running 
at a loss . 
/ 3 . The 
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3. The stages of development and the State enterprises 
These were the main ways in which various types of enterprises were 
nationalized. To complete the picture, i t is of interest to show how they 
were transferred to the public sector at each stage of industrialization in 
Latin America. It should be noted that, in each successive stage outlined 
below, the emergence of a new phase does not imply the disappearance of the 
previous phase, but a shift in the main emphasis. 
At the initial stage, when the essential motive force for economic 
growth was exports, the State enterprises generally had l i t t l e part to play. 
At that time, the operation of public utilities was bound up with international 
trade and produced high profits, both from the running of the utilities and 
in terms of incentives provided by governments (particularly guaranteed profits 
and loans). Thus, the main infrastructural items needed to extract and 
transport the chief export products were generally in the hands of foreign 
firms, as was normally the case with railways, ports and electricity. Government 
action usually took the form of control of these and other public .services, 
promotion of industries and regions where private enterprise was not yielding 
good enough results and provision of certain less important public services 
not connected with exports (water supply, urban transport, etc . ) . An exception 
to this rule was the petroleum industry, which was State controlled in some 
countries. 
The situation changed radically in the next stage of industrial growth. 
In particular, industrialization itself would not have been practicable 
without State protection (both in the form of tariffs and of loans), with 0 
the result that the operation of public services. , which had been designed for 
a specific situation, area and activity, ceased to attract private capital. 
In addition, there was a movement, more pronounced in the post-war period, 
which made nationalization of public services and basic resources a political 
platform. Thus, several countries nationalized transport (particularly 
railways:), electricity and communications services. In many cases this process 
was accepted by the former owners, for a variety of reasons, such as 
unprofitability of the enterprises, difficulties in remitting profits, the 
running out of concessions or of tax exemptions, etc», which coincided with 




nationalization of enterprises producing goods for export - of which Mexican 
petroleum and Bolivian tin are outstanding examples - the causes were mainly 
pol i t i ca l , since the nationalization of these enterprises had been one of the 
demands of revolutionary movements» 
Only at a more advanced stage of industrialization did the State v 
participate fu l ly in the economy as entrepreneur and producer of goods of 
all kinds. This phase has several typical features. In the f i r s t place, 
i t coincides with the acceptance of the view that the control and 
nationalization of enterprises and the creation of new enterprises are a means 
to an end® Moreover, in countries at a more advanced stage of industrialization 
big firms predominate — so "big that they are usually be3^ ond the reach of 
national entrepreneurs and therefore largely dependent on foreign or State 
financing. During the f i r s t stage of development, food texti le production 
and simple enginneering were within the reach of local capital and \ 
technology; on the other hand, the production of capital goods, automotive 
products, heavy chemicals, electronic equipment and even household consumer 
durables, which are the backbone of the new stage of industrialization, could, 
with a few exceptions, be financed in Latin America only with foreign capital 
or public funds because of their costs, size and technology. This fact i s 
illustrated by the l i s t of the thirty largest non-financial institutions 
in Argentina and Brazil in tables 2 and 3» In this case, the nature and 
magnitude of State participation is bound up with the basic orientation of 
the industr ia l izat ion process, since investment, production and price c r i t e r ia 
may be introduced that"conflict with the aim of obtaining maximum profits. 
In other words, entrepreneurial action by the State is, apt to be guided by 
standards of social benefit that cannot be expected of private enterprise. 
Three cases of this link betxveen the State enterprise and basic policy are 
given below. 
First, there are the countries which think that the State enterprises 
should only supplement private enterprise, in particular, giving i t 
infrastructural support and supplying the inputs and services i t needsj in 
such cases, the action of State enterprises i s adapted to the context of 
economic laissez-faire. One example is the case of Argentina, whose 
/national policies 
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national policies — define the role of State-owned enterprises. They provide 
that the State's industrial activities to meet essential needs, particularly 
in the social sphere, shall be of a temporary nature or shall be transferred 
to the private sector i f they do not successfully achieve their purpose. 
They also provj.de that the State shall carry on activities that are necessary 
to the welfare of the community or connected with basic industries which do 
not attract private enterprise. In the special case of strategic activities 
and the exploitation of natural resources, the State shall participate when 
required to do so in the national interest. In addition, the State shall 
retain responsibility for the production of those articles and effects that are 
directly bound up with military needs and which, by their nature^ are not 
suitable for private manufacture® 
A second case is that of Peru, where a general industrial law (Decree 
No, 18350, promulgated on 27 July 1970) was introduced in an attempt to 
ensure that the State should have the guiding role in the industrialization 
process, through State control of basic industry,^ The law reserves the 
basic industries for the public sector, which, in addition, shall participate, 
alone or as a partner, in the other industries, when this is in the interest 
of permanent and self-sustaining industrial development (Article 7). In 
exceptional cases, the private sector, including co-operatives, may 
participate in the basic industries, provided that a contract is drawn up 
laying down the conditions and time limits within which the or.Tiershi;? of those 
enterprises shell revert to the State, after valuation and payment (Article 8), 
Basic industries are considered to be those that produce fundamental inputs 
for productive activities; they include iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, 
basic chemicals, f e r t i l i z e r s , cement and paper (Article 4 and fifth part of 
the Decree), 
. y Decree No, 46 of 17 June 1970, See "national policy" No, 124, on 
activities controlled by the State, 
¿ / Presidential message from General Juan Velasco Alvarado, published in 




The third case is that of enterprises that operate under a socialist 
regime. In the case of Cuba, for instance, all industies and services and 
most, agricultural holdings are State-owned. Thus, the criterion for the 
management of the enterprises consists in bringing them into line with the 
requirements of the national plan; conseouently, business profit is no 
longer the motive force of production and is not even retained as a standard 
of efficiency. In addition, through price control, revenue can be transferred 
to the State on the scale established in the plan. 
This brief outline of the roles assigned to the State enterprises in 
three different cases shows fairly clearly their potential and limitations 
as policy instruments. Above al l , i t can be seen that the fact that some 
activity or other is State-run does not necessarily indicate the ideology 
or objectives of the State. A public enterprise may serve both to support 
private enterprise and as an instrument of action for a socialist regime; 
thus, i t may subsidize private enterprise - by supplying cheap inputs and 
services - or i t may be an important source of autonomous capital. All 
depends on the context in which the enterprise operates. 
However, the shift of the economic centre of gravity to the large 
enterprises which are characteristic of the more advanced stages of 
industrialization gives them new value and importance. Indeed, as was 
pointed out earlier, that dynamic nucleus can normally be financed only by 
foreign capital and government funds. This means that there are various 
possible solutions: f irst , State ownership of the enterprise; secondly, the 
transfer of funds to the local private entrepreneur; thirdly, the establishment 
of mixed companies owned partly by the State and partly by local entrepreneurs; 
and fourthly, mixed companies in which the State or local entrepreneurs combine 
with foreign interests; and f i f thly, foreign ownership of the enterprise* 
At all events, the policy - or lack of policy' - on State enterprises is 
becoming one of the basic determinants of economic policy. If it is 
intended to change the nature of that sector of growth and thus influence 
the basic features of development, the State enterprise may be one of the 
most direct and efficient instruments of policy. To attract private 
enterprises to certain sectors, a wide range of profit incentives are 
available; but i f the quality of the type of production undertaken is to 
be improved, action by the State enterprises is required and has a decisive 
and immediate effect» 
/ 4 . The 
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4. The enterprises that are considered 
This study i s not concerned with all the enterprises in which the 
State invests capital, but only with those that have a legal personality and 
which, in addition, are of interest because of their contribution to savings 
and investment. Since they do not have legal personality, the bodies that 
form part of the central public administration are excluded, although they 
may carry on activities similar to those which are undertaken by State 
enterprises elsewhere. For instance, according to the ray in which they are 
organized, the authorities for drinking water supply, urban transport, harbour 
administration, goods storage, etc. are considered for some, countries and not 
for others. Moreover, banks, financial institutions and insurance companies 
are not considered because they are different in character and deserve 
separate treatment on account of their importance. In.particular, certain 
aspects wil l be considered from another angle in the chapter on financial 
intermediaries. 
The second condition for the inclusion of public enterprises in this 
study is that the State should either own al l the capital invested in the 
enterprises or own enough to give i t direct control of their policy or 
management. In other words, i t must be for the State to take decisions, 
such as specifying the volume and destination of output, fixing tar i f f s and 
prices, and deciding between alternative technologies. In the case of 
mixed companies, i t will be necessary to decide in eech case whether or not 
the State has the necessary decisionmaking power when it has only a 
minority interest. In some cases the State holds shares merely to guarantee 
a loan, while in others i ts shares give i t a real say in the running of the 
enterprise. To determine which is true in a given case, i t wil l be necessary 
to see what kind of enterprise i t i s , since basically i t would be a question 
of facts, such as the degree of dispersion or concentration of the remaining 
shares, the composition of i t s management, etc. 
Mention must be made of one thing which has cut down the number of 
enterprises that have been considered, namely, lack of information on many 
of them. For this reason, i t has not been possible to include, for instance, 
state or provincial and municipal enterprises., which are cuite important in 
some countries. The real size of the sector has not been explored, and only 




5« The Importance of public enterprises 
For a preliminary appraisal of the importance of public enterprises 
i t is useful to determine their relative importance by means of certain 
indicators. For this purpose a study will be made of the coefficient of 
over-all investment in relation to the product, and of the share of 
investment by the public sector and by public enterprises in gross fixed 
capital foimation for those countries on which data are available (see 
table l ) . In addition, consideration will be given to the position of 
public enterprises among the thirty most important enterprises of two countries, 
according to their scale or economic size (see tables 2 and 3)• 
(a) Contribution of public enterprises to capital formation 
Table 1 shows the investment coefficient in relation to the product 
and the share of public enterprises airi general government in fixed capital 
formation. It is impossible to generalize since the figures differ widely 
according to the situation in each country» For instance, between the beginning 
and the end of the period considered, the proportion of public investment 
in total investment increased substantially while the investment coefficient 
in relation to the product declined in Chile, Colombia and Peru; both these 
ratios increased in Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico and Paraguay and decreased 
in Ecuador; and public investment remained at the same level in Brazil and 
Panaria while total investment increased* Taking public investment alone, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Ecuador show the highest coefficients; and there 
was a substantial increase in Paraguay between 1962 and 1968• 3h general, a 
rising trend is observable in the share of public investment in all the 
countries except Ecuador and, to a much lesser extent, Panama® 
The proportion of investment by public enterprises was highest in Bolivia 
(nearly 40 per cent of the total) ; i t ranged from 14 to 16 per cent in 
Argentina," Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, and from 6 to 10 per cent in 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama and Peru. These figures* in general, reflect 
the existence or absence of large-scale mining, petroleum, energy or 
communications enterprises, and of extensive State railways net works, 





LATIN AMERICA: RATIO OF GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT TO THE GROSS 
DOMESTIC FRODUCTj AND SHARE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN 
TOTAL FIXED INVESTMENT 
Gross- fixed 
investment as a 
Percentage share of public 
sector in total fixed 
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Table 1 (Conci.) 
Gross fixed 
investment as a 
share of putflLic 
sector in total fixed 
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Source: SCIA, on the basis of o f f i c ia l statistics.-
a/ Including many Federal Government enterprises. 
Only some of the public enterprises. v 
Incomplete data covering the most important pfublic enterprises. 
Direct -investment by the remaining enterprises i s not included in 
total public investment. 





ARGENTINA: THE THIRTY LARGEST INDUSTRIAL AND PUBLIC SERVICE 
ENTERPRISES ACCORDING TO VOLUME OF SALES, 1969 
(Millions of pesos) 
Enterprise Sales Ownership 
1. Yacimientos Petrolíferos 
Fiscales Petroleum .214 137 Public 
2. Fiat Motor vehicles 162 184 Foreign 
3. Shell Petroleum a 614 Foreign 
kr* Empresa Ferrocarriles del 
Estado Argentino Transport 80 630 Public 
5. Es so Petroleum 75.098 Foreign 
6. Servicios Eléctricos del 
Gran Buenos Aires? Electricity 69 741 Public 
7» Sociedad Mixta Siderúrgica 
Argentina Steel 66 525 Public 
8. Ford Motor vehicles 57 757 Foreign 
9. Gas del Estado Petroleum 53 598 Public 
10. General Motors Motor vehicles 50 066 Foreign 
11. Swift Food 48 942 Foreign 
12. IKA - Renault Motor vehicles 48 067 Foreign 
13. Empresa Nacional de 
Telecomunicaciones Communications 48 067 Public 
14. Nobleza Tobacco 45 935 Local private 
15. Molinos Río de la Plata Food 40 897 Local private 
16. Agua y Energía Eléctrica Electricity 38 260 Public 
17. Corporación Argentina de 
Productores de Carne Food 36 568 Local Private 
IB. Chrysler Motor vehicles 32. 243 Foreign 
19* Sociedad Anónima Franco^ 
Argentina de Automotores 
(SAFRAR) Motor vehicles 27 524 Foreign 
20* Industria Argentina de Aceros 
(AC INDAR) Steel 27 108 Local private 
/Table 2 (Conci.) 
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Table 2 (Conci>) 
Enterprise Activity Sales Ownership 
21. Aerolíneas Argentinas Transport 24 019 Public 
22. Good Tear Tyres 24 000 Foreign 
• 
CM Alpargatas Shoes with 
hemp soles 
(alpargatas) 
•23 544 Local private 
24* Empresa Líneas Marítimas 
Argentinas Transport 22,177 Public 
25» Celulosa Paper 21 819 Local Flivate 
26. Ducilo Chemicals: 19 500 Foreign 
27. Loma Negra Cement 19 438 Local Private 
28. Firestone Tyres 18 000 Foreign. 
29. Pirelli Rubber 17.791 Foreign 
30. Mercedes Benz Motor vehicles 17 780 Foreign 
Source; For public enterprises, ECLA, on the basis of official, statistics; 






BRAZIL: THE THIRTY LARGEST CORPORATIONS, ACCORDING TO THEIR 
LIQUID NET WORTH, 1969 
(Thousands of new cruzeiros) 




















Centrais Eletricas de Sao Paulo 
Petroleo Brasileiro - PETROBRAS 
Light - Servidos de Eletricidade 
Companhia Telefónica Brasileira 
Companhiâ Siderúrgica Nacional 
Central Elétrica de Furñas 
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce 
S® A o Industrias Reunidas 
F. Matarazzo 











Companhia de Cigarros Souza Cruz Tobacco 
Companhia Hidro Elétrica do 
Sao Francisco 
Companhia Paulista de Força 
e Luz 
Volkswagen do Brasil 
Rhoda - Industrias Químicas 
e Texteis 
4 
Companhia Estadual de Energía 
Elétrica 
Usinas Siderúrgicas de Minas 
Gérais 
Pirelli S.A. Companhia 
Industrial Bras. 
Companhia Geral de Motores 
do Brasil 
S.A. Industrias Votorantim 












3 530 845 
2 692 649 
1 954 263 











635 161 Local private 
500 284 Public 
495 992 Foreign 
484 909 Public 
457 128 Public 
454 368 Foreign 
444 100 Foreign 
408 470 Public 
383 650 Public 
335 782 Foreign 
328 825 Foreign 
328 764 Local private 
188 791 Foreign 




flcMLe ? (QoncJU) 
Enterprise Activity Liquid net Ownership 
worth 
21. Companhia Paranaense de 
Energía Elétrica Electricity 283 753 Public 
22. Companhia Cervejaria Brahma Beverages 252 644 Local private 
23. Companhia Siderúrgica 
Belgo-Mineira Steel 235 217 Foreign 
24. Companhia Ajos Especiáis 
Itabira (Acesita) Steel 233 337 Semi-public 
25. General Electric S.A. Electrical 
products 
226 330 Foreign 
26. Esso Brasileira de Petróleo Petroleum 217 575 Foreign 
27. Centráis Elétricas de Goiás Electricity 204 023 Public 
28. Construjoes e Com. Camargo 
Correa 
Construction 201 658 Local private 
and foreign 
29. Companhia Antarotica Paulista Beverages 201 123 Local private 
30. Refinaria e Explotacao de 
Petróleo Uniao Petroleum 192 963 Foreign 
Source : Con.luntura Economica. vol, 24, No. 9, 1970. 
/ ( b ) Position 
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(b) Position of public enterprises among the major enterprises 
As.regards size, large-scale public enterprises are among those with 
the most sales and capital in each country. In Argentina and Brazil, in 
particular, the thirty largest enterprises are mainly public and foreign 
enterprises» Tables 2 and 3 show that 43 per cent of the total sales of 
the thirty largest industrial and public service enterprises are accounted 
for by public enterprises, 42 per cent by foreign firms and 15 per cent 
by local private enterprises. In Brazil, 65 per cent of the liquid net worth 
of the thirty largest corporations belonged to public enterprises, 28 to 
foreign firms and 7 per cent to local private enterprises. In Argentina, 
the activities of the major public enterprises (nine out of the thirty 
considered) cover petroleum and gas (43 per cent of total sales), transport 
(20 per cent), electricity (18 per cent), steel (11 per cent) and 
communications (8 per cent). In Brazil, on the other hand, the activities of 
public enterprises with the highest liquid net worth (thirteen out of the 
thirty considered) cover electricity (54 per cent), petroleum (22 per cent), 
steel (9 per cent), communications (9 per cent) and mining (6 per cent),, 
In assessing the differences between Argentina and Brazil i t must be borne 
in mind that, owing to the kind of data available, different indicators were 
used (volume of sales for Argentina and liquid net worth for Brazil)« 
(c) Main sectors in which public enterprises operate 
If the public enterprises existing in each country are examined, they 
are seen to be of two types (see table 4)» In one group of countries -
Argentina and Colombia, for example - public enterprises are important in 
certain sectors related to infrastructure (transport, communications and 
electric power) and the supply of inputs (petroleum in both countries and 
steel in Argentina). About half the sales of the enterprises considered 
- excluding the steel companies - are accounted for by the petroleum 
enterprises. In contrast, there are few public enterprises engaged in 
manufacturing: in Argentina sales of manufactures by all the enterprises 
considered amount to only 3.8 per cent of total sales, and in Colombia to 
2.2. per cent. In other countries, such as Mexico and the Dominican 
Republic, however, there are a good many enterprises engaged in manufacturing, 
in addition to those providing public services and basic inputs; in the 
Dominican Republic they account for 30 per cent of total sales and in Mexico 
for 28 per cent of the total capital of the public enterprises studied. A 
complete l i s t of the enterprises considered is given in the appendix to this 
chapter, tables A to G. /Table 4 
Table 4 
LATIN AKERICAi PARTIAL IKVENTORT OP FUBUC ENTERPRISES '-ö W 
i s CD S 
Argentina (1969) 
Number of enterprises | 2 
Number of persons employed | 43 035 
Capital Millions 232 * 
of pesos 
Sales 1 Millions 267 735.O 
of pesos 
Peroentage of tota l sales (| 51*6 
M 
îîanufao- Elaotr i - Maritime Air Teleoom-
l t Petroleum Steel turing c i t y transport t rans - munioa-
port tions 
Urban Ra i l - Other 






Number of enterprises 
Sales 
Peroentage *f tota l sales j i 
SolmaBla (I968) | 
Number of enterprise» . j 
Number ef persons employed*^ ' 
Sales Millions 
of pesos 
Percentage of tota l sales 
Chile (1968) 1 
Number of enterprises j 
Number of persons employed 
Capital f a i l l ons of 
eseudos 
Sales Millions of 
eseudos 
Percentage of tota l sales 
1 " / \ 1 3 6 359^  13 7132/ 12 688 
19 585.4 38 260.0^  35 205.4 24 019.0 i;« 066.6 
1 1 
5 471 42 353 / 3 912^  2 862 
1 
150 l4i 














519 192.5^  






122.6 * 3'+5.3 ... 1 32,0 3 7.5 a.. • •• 1 204.1 « •« S 30 3 058,6 























u 387^  
333.9 
3 646 , 
38.72/ 
30 8o4-/ . 
2 589.6^  
2.2 0.1 13.9 1.6 17.4 12.9 1.5 103.0 
07S 
7%r 
4 ••• 1 7 ?70 
8co 
2 
. . . 
. •• 
















• •• 42 288^  
... 
103.5^  318.8^  276.8 143.0 139.6 33.1 99.5^  526.7 332.9 66» 7 3 7580l^  
25.2 8.5 7»'* 3.8 3.7 0.9 2.6 1.2 14.0 8.8 1.9 100,0 
Table >t (sont . ) 
Unit Petroleum Steel Manufae- Eleotri-turlng c i ty 
Maritime 
transport 
Air Teleoom- Urban 
trans- mud gel- - Trade trans-







Hunger of enterprises % 2 26 3 0 2 0 6 1 k 2 52 Number ef persons employed ••• v / ••• ... / 1 000,65^  
••• v / ... 80 OOS . ... 150,1^  «11,1 Capital Millions of 259,©-' 780,0 1 202,7s- 128.SP 688,7^  127.0 
pesos 
Peru (1966) 
Number of enterprises 1 1 5 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 io e8ir^  Number ef persons employedSi/ 1 20S 1 »«51 7 2^5 ••• ... • •• ... ••• ... ... ••• 
Deminiean Republio (1967) 
Number of enterprises . 
Number of xenons empleyed^ ' 







fi ... là*! 0 2 f f / 881^ 4 726-^  
267 962»^ Capital®" Thousands 3 eco, o • •• 52 612,4 37 000,0 830,0 ... 12 21 ®60«3 ... 1U1 000.0 
jj/ »f pesos 
Salear-^  Thousands ... 47 056.9^ 20 198,7 ••• 2 lMt.O ,», 6 769.3^  ^  . . .80 692,5 157 26686^  
t of pesos Peraentage of total sales 29.9 12,8 «f.l 0,5 51.3 IS0.9 
Venezuela (1966) 
tUber of enterprises 




1 31^ .0 3 , 2 72.8^ 356.1» 
Ì 
1(00.0 557.2^  
s 1 • •• 2 0 7^.6 ... 
23 , 
balfvares 
Sales L^ilians of 179.I »U8.1 185,1^  272.3 102.2" ^187.5 287.8^  ... • •• 5 iSa/ ... 1 671,5^  
b e l f v a r e s 
Percentage of total sales 10,7 25.0 11,1 16,3 6.1 11.2 17.2 2.2 oa 100*0 
Source; As for Tables A to 0 in Appendix: f o r Peru. Instituto 
kf Three enterprises only* 
b / Water and eleotrio power only« 
0 / Buenos Aires underground railway only* 
§ / Fourteen enterprises only, 
e / Capital of Yagiaientos Petroliferas Fiscalss only. 
Sixteen enterprises only« 
§ / Only soma Federal Government enterprises« 
Nacional de P lani f i cad in . Plan de Desarrollo Económico Septal, 1967-1970. 
h / Inoluciing petroleum and chemicals.- ' 
i / Ai l transport seotors, 
¡ / Figuras f o r 1970» 
k / Empresa Colombiana de Productos Veterinarios enly. 
1 / Empresa de Puerto a de Colombia only» 
m/ Figure f a r 1969. 





Table >4 (Conol,) 
0 / Excluding Cerporaoltfn Autinoma Regional del Cbulndfo. 00/ 
g / Thirteen enterprises only* dd/ 
3 / Pour enterprises only*. j ee / 
* / Millions of dollars, f ^ 
s / Sales plus return eh Investment*: gg / 
t / Exoluding Petroquimloa Chllena, S,£, hh/ 
ECA only. 11/ 
^ Diesel Kaolonal S, V enly. . . . .|j/ 
w/ Twenty-five enterprises only* kk/ 
•¡f Compaflfa deluz y Puerza del CentroS.A. only. 11/ 
No data available for the Comlsitfn Federal de Eleotrioi$9.d. m / 
2 / Aeronaves de, H&cieo S,A. only* . xua/ 
if f ive enterprises only» so / 
aa/ Two enterprises only. pq/ 
kb/ Forty-four enterprises only* ^ qq/ 
h3 W ts 
Figures for 1964. 
Six enterprises only. 
ftfljj gypsyia ohly« 
Cons© rolo Algodonero only* 
Registered oapltal. 
Pi rty-f lve enterprises only* 
Figure® for 1966* 
Fifteen enterprises only* 
Seven enterprises only. 
Twenty-seven enterprises only* 
State oapltal. 
Five enterprises only; two have some State oapltal, 
nineteen enterprises only. 
Figure f o r 1967, 
Institute Autifnome de Adnlnlstraoltfn de los Forrooar ri les del Estado only. 
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II . THE STATE ENTERPRISES AS AGENTS OF A DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
Some data have just been given on the importance of State enterprises in 
Latin America* It will now be of interest to evaluate their role as agents 
of development policy, to which end some economic and management problems will 
be reviewed, 
1. Economic aspects 
(a) Extent of the influence of public enterprises compared with other agents 
of development policy 
The preparation and application of an economic policy calls for the 
use of suitable instruments for i t s implementation. But from the point of 
view of the State i t is not enough to determine the suitability of those 
instruments in theory; their real work ability must also be established,. 
In other words, two things are being discussed: the principles which underlie 
action in the public and private sectors and the State*s practical possibilities 
óf making its decisions effective. 
In particular, there may be a clash of interests between the public 
sector and some or all of the private entrepreneurs (an obvious example of 
this i s price control). On the other hand, the public sector, by definition, 
follows government directives; and i f , at times, i t does not carry out 
government policy to the letter, this is not due to a conflict of interests 
or a divergence of objectives, but to practical circumstances such as a rigid 
organizational structure or inadequate resources. Thus, when there is no 
direct control of the private sector, an attempt is made to see that i ts 
interests coincide with those of the public sector (for instance, through 
better returns on the type of investment to which the government assigns 
priority). 
However, when the State exercises i ts decision-making power directly, 
its influence declines the further the f ie ld of action l ies from the decision-
making centre. This might be represented by a series of concentric circles 
spreading out from the centre of power* In the centre is the central 
government, which is responsible exclusively to the national authorities 
for the action i t takes, specially expenditure; next come the local 
/authorities and 
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authorities and the decentralized agencies, and in the third circle* the 
State enterprises. The State acts directly in all three areas* the only-
difference being in the relative simplicity or complexity of the legal and 
administrative machinery through which i t transmits directions or orders« 
Outside these three circles pf direct control there are areas of influence^ 
which include credit and foreign trade policies* (particularly regarding 
imports and exchange rates)* action in respect of prices* wages and salaries* 
and investment outside the public sector« Even further out lies, the sphere 
of the indirect influence exerted by institutions and by financial* credit 
and development policy. 
Thus* in order to determine the current and possible future role of the 
State* i t would be necessary to evaluate the importance of each of the 
instruments mentioned above in the economy as a whole and the degree of 
influence exerted by the State on the decision-making centres. But this is 
not a one-way relationship; the governments capacity to make efficient use 
of the policy instruments available to i t must also be considered. For example, 
in the case of public enterprises* it is not uncommon for the operations of 
State enterprises to be unrelated* restricted to patterns of private 
enterprise and unconnected with an over-all development policy. 
Now that the State enterprises can be seen in this context* an analysis 
will be made of their role in the formation of capital for investment* their 
influence on technological policy and on the establishment or expansion of 
capital goods industries* their contribution to supply* and their role in 
maintaining market stability, 
(b) The formation of capital for investment 
To analyse the influence of public enterprises on the formation of 
investment capital* i t may be useful to examine the financial results of 
their activities in different countries* and then to point out some of the 
reasons for this situation* especially for what has happened in respect both 
of the relative price and tariff levels* and of wages and salaries and 
investment, 
/ ( i ) Financial 
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( i ) Financial results of the activities c-f public enterprises. In order 
to obtain a rough idea of the financial results of the activities of the 
major public enterprises of four countries which data are av3.ilc.ble, tv:o 
indicators have been used: the operating surplus or deficit in terms of 
earnings from sales or services, and where there is an over-all surplus on 
the proportion of capital expenditure covered by the surplus. Subsidies 
and other current transfers have been deducted from current income 
as they distort the real financial results of operating the enterprise. 
Moreover, as these data only apply to one year, they should not be taken as 
anything more than a rough indication of the true financial situation, which 
in any case does not necessarily reflect the enterprise13 effiency since 
a def ic i t may simply be the result of a government prices policy. 
An analysis of these indicators leads to some conclusions that are 
applicable to all the enterprises considered, and to others that are applicable 
to only some of the countries. Taking the universe of enterprises considered 
in each country, the operating surplus is seen to represent 14 and 9 per 
cent of earnings in Argentina and Chile respectively, while in Colombia 
i t is as high as 32 per cent, and Brazil shows a def ic i t . Not one of these 
countries, however, had a large enough over-all surplus to cover fixed 
investment: in Argentina i t financed slightly less than half, in Colombia 
40 per cent.and in Chile 34 per cent. When compared with total capital 
expenditure, the figures are naturally lower and stand at around a third 
for Argentina and Colombia and only *9 per cent for Chile (not including 
steel, for lack of information). 
Taking each country and enterprise separately, i t can be seen that 
a single enterprise in Argentina, Ferrocarriles Argentinos, was responsible 
c 
for 86 per cent of the total operating deficit of eight enterprises, 
Yacimientos Carboníferos Fiscales for a further 9 per cent, and others, 
mainly transport companies, for the remainder. In absolute terms, the 
biggest operating surpluses come from YPF, the Empresa Nacional de 
Telecomunicaciones, Agua y Energía Eléctrica and the Sociedad Mixta 
Siderúrgica Argentina. In only two cases, however, Transportes de Buenos 
Aires and the Administración General de Puertos were the over-all surpluses 
large enough to cover capital expenditure (see table)« 




ARGENTINA? INDICATORS FOR SELECTED PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 
BY SECTOR, 1969 
(Percentages) 
Manufacturing 
Industrias Mecánicas del Estado 
Talleres de Reparaciones Navales 
Astilleros y Fábricas Navales del 
Estado 
Dirección Nacional de Industrias 
del Estado 
Sociedad Mixta Siderúrgica 
Argentina (SQMISA) 
Mining 
Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales 
Gas del Estado 
Yacimientos Carboníferos Fiscales 
yransr>ort and assimilated sectors 
Empresa Líneas Marítimas Argentinas 
Empresa Flota Fluvial del Estado 
Argentino 
Administración General de Puertos 
Transportes de Buenos Aires 
Empresa de Ferrocarriles Argentinos 
Subterráneo de Buenos Aires 
Aerolíneas Argentinas 
Empresa Nacional dé Comunicaciones 
Agua y Energía Eléctrica 
Operating surplus ! feges and Salaries 









3.0 39.8 43.3 








































As regards the Brazilian enterprises, which are grouped according to 
sector, the largest operating deficits were found in transport and. 
communications and the biggest surpluses in chemical and petroleum, mining 
energy and steel. Nonetheless, i t i s precisely in energy.and steel that the 
over-all surplus covers least of the capital expenditure, owing to the high 
level of investment involved (see table 6). 
In Colombia, Ferrocarriles Nacionales accounted for 84 per cent of the 
combined deficit of five enterprises, the.remainder deriving from the 
Instituto Colombiano de Energía Eléctrica,,which constructs generating plants 
and carries out studies on electrification, the Empresa Colombiana de 
Aeródromos, the Corporación de la Industria Aeronáutica and the Compañía 
Nacional de Navegación in descending order. Apart from the Instituto de 
Mercado Agropecuario, whose operating costs do not include a single item 
that i s large, enough to explain the huse earnings which account for i ts 
large surplus, the biggest operating surpluses carae from the Eapresa Colombiana 
de Petróleo, the Empresa Nacional d^ Telecomunicaciones and the Empresa de 
Puertos de Colombia. Only tvro enterprises, however, the Empresa Colombiana de 
Productos Veterinarios and the Industria de Concreto (INCO) Ltda., had an. 
over-all surplus that vías more than enough to cover their capital expenditure 
(see table 7). 
As to Chile, nine of the fifteen enterprises considered showed an 
operating def ic i t : of the -total def ic i t , 60 per cent was accounted for by 
the Ferrocarriles del Estado, 16 per cent by the Einpresa de Comercio 
Agrícola, 8 per cent by the Empresa de Transportes Colectivos and 6 per cent 
by the Empresa Portuaria, the five remaining enterprises making up the rest. 
The enterprises with the highest operating surpluses include the 
Bnpresa Nacional del Petróleo (ENAP), the Compañía de Acero del Pacifico 
and the Empresa Nacional de SLectricidad (ENDESA), but only ENAP and the 
Empresa de Agua Potable had big enough over-all surplus to cover capital 
expenditure. There are only fragmentary data available on the capital 
expenditure of the Compañía de Acero del Pacífico (see table 8). 
Taking,the enterprises according to type, i t can be seen that, as a 
general rule, the operating over-all surpluses are not large enough to cover 
capital expenditure, even in the case of the most profitable of them - the 
petroleum enterprises. Apart from Chile's ENAP, whose earnings in 1968 more than 




BRAZIL: INDICATORS FOR SELECTED PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, 
BY SECTOR 
(Percentages) 
Operating surplus Wages and 
_ _ _ _ — - salaries 
Sector Tear Earnings Capital expenditure 
Current 
expenditure 
Mining I960 26.5 62.8 33.3 
1965 47.7 166.2 39*6 
Steel I960 18.0 41.7 17.2 
1965 10.2 9.1 28,,0 
Chemicals and petroleum I960 16.4 37.2 11.0 
1965 7.6 60.8 11.9 
Manufacturing etc. I960 -18.5 neg. 31.3 
1965 -17.7' neg. 39.1 
Electric energy i960 50.0 0.4 33.3 
1965 42.9 12.3 8.4 
Transport I960 -U7.0 neg. 51.7 
1965 -119.5 neg. 55.3 
Comnruni c ations I960 -358.3 • • • 69.1 
1965 -262.2 • • • 95.3 
Supply- i960 ... • • • • • • 
1965 16.0 a/ 50.8 
Source; See appendix to Part One, table B. 
a/ Total capital expenditure was negative because of changes in stocks. 




COLOMBIA: INDICATORS PCR SELECT PUBLIC 
ENTERTE EES, I960 
(Percentages) 
Operating surplus 






Empresa Colombiana de Productos 
Veterinarios 64 #4 55.4 62.8 
Cementos Boyacá 3. A. 24.4 ... 28.2 
Industria de Concreto "INCO" 
Ltda. 
I3.2 343.6 32.9 
Empresa Colombiana de Petroleo 18.9 42.4 20.8 
transport and communications 
Compañía Nacional de Navegación -3 .1 • • » 31.1 
Empresa Puertos .de Colombia 24» 3 56.8 89.6 
Corporación Industria 
Aeronáutica 
-60.5 nego 51.8 
Empresa Colombiana de Aeródromo • -6 .9 neg* 77.3 
Ferrocarriles Nacionales -I9.9 neg. 69.6 
Empresa Nacional de 
Telecomunicaciones 
32.2 128*5 77.2 
Instituto Colombiano de Energía -660.8 
Eléctrica 
neg. 60.8 
Instituto de Mercadeo 
Agropecuario 89.1 69.4 77.2 





CHILEí INDICATORS FOR SELECTED PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, 1968 
(Percentages) 
Operating surplus Wages and 
Lai 
. Capital Current 
Earnings e:CTenditure expenditure 
Transp'ort and communications 
Empresa Portuaria (EMPHEPQRT) 
Empresa Marítima del Estado (EMPREMAR) 
Línea Aérea Nacional (LAN) 
Ferrocarriles del Estado 
Empresa Transportes Colectivos 
Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones 
Industxy 
Industria Azucarera Nacional (IANSA) 
Astilleros Marítimos (ASMAR) 
Fábrica de Material del Ejército (FAMAE) 
Compañía Acero del Pacífico (CAP) 
Mining 
Empresa Nacional de Minería (ENAMl) 
Energy and fuels 
Empresa Nacional de Electricidad (ENDESA) 
Empresa Nacional del Petróleo (ENAP) 
Trade 
Empresa de Comercio Agrícola (ECA) 
Services 
Empresa de Agua Potable 
-25.1 neg. 77.8 
-59.0 neg. 38.7 
-7.6 neg. 34.4 
-90.9 neg. 69.0 
-84.4 neg. 60.3 
31.7 24.0 40,9 * 
-1.3 neg. 13*8 
-10.1 neg. 79.7 
-21.4 neg. 50.4 
22.8 ... . .. 
9.2 30.9 14.1 
36.6 26,2 33.2 
47.9 155.3 19.9 
-78.4 neg. 17.5 
48.1 126.0 67,5 
Source? See appendix to Part One, table E. 
/covered i ts 
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covered i ts fixed investment and exceeded i t s capital expenditure by 55 per 
cent* the petroleum companies considered managed to cover only between 
40 per cent (Empresa Colombiana de Petroleo) and 80 per cent (YPF Argentina) 
of their capital expenditure from their own resources. Of the electrical 
enterprises* Argentina*s Agua y Energia Elgctrica financed slightly more 
than 40 per cent of i ts capital expenditure in 1968* whereas two semi-
public state enterprises in Brazil covered* on an average* only 10 per cent 
of theirs* and ENDESA* in Chile* 26 per cent* The financial situation seems 
to be rather more alarming in the iron and steel sector* where a study carried 
out in I964 by the Latin American Iron and Steel Institute (instituto 
Latinoamericano del Fierro y del Acero - ILAFA) showed that* in twenty-two 
public and private enterprises* reinvested earnings covered a mere 4.6 per 
cent of total investment. Finally* all the railway companies considered 
showed current operating defic its . 
Looking at the situation of each country separately* i t may be 
concluded that the operation of public enterprises does not, in the long run* 
generate any appreciable share of investment resources; as has already 
been pointed out, the operating surplus was 9 and 14 per cent of earnings 
in Chile and Argentina* 32 per cent in Colombia* while Brazil showed a 
deficit - and* in the three countries that show a surplus* this covered 
only between a third and half of the enterprises1 own fixed investment* 
The figures by type of activity, however* show that petroleum and electric 
energy enterprises financed quite a substantial percentage of their investment» 
( i i ) Price and rate policy» For an appraisal of'the results from a 
different standpoint, i t is.useful to examine how far they have been affected 
by receipts and expenditure, or, i© other words* what price and rate policies 
have been applied, on the one hand, and what wage and investment policies on 
the other. 
Generally speaking* the price and rate policy of a public enterprise 
is devised according to the function assigned to i t at a given time. Thus* 
one school of thought holds that* in-descending order of requirements* such 
enterprises should either produce a surplus* cover their capital expenditure 
or just show no operating def ic it ; another holds the view that, for social* 
political or economic development reasons, i t is permissible for them to 
operate at a loss. These ideas may relate either to all or to certain 
/groups of 
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groups of public enterprises. A brief description of the trends in the 
real rates of certain enterprises over the last few years is given below.— 
Except in a few cases, railway rates, measured by average receipts 
per transport unit, declined in real terms between i960 and 1968, In 
passenger transport, they dropped 10 per cent in Mexico, 20 to 30 per cent 
in Chile and Peru, and as much as 45 per cent in Uruguay. On the other 
hand, they improved somewhat in Argentina and Colombia, and remained at 
about the same level in Brazil. Freight rates plummeted in all countries 
except Colombia, where there was no change in real terms. 
The average prices for electric power charged by the two Argentine 
enterprises considered f e l l by about.10 per cent. That of the Comisión 
Federal de Electricidad de Mexico rose 17 per cent, as a result of changes 
in the composition of sales by certain groups of users. The average sales 
price of the main Peruvian enterprise, which is privately-owned, declined 
20 per cent, while in Venezuela the State-owned enterprise CADAFE recorded 
a very slight reduction and the most important private enterprise a drop 
of 17 per cent* Average prices of the Compañía Panameña de Fuerza y Luz 
dropped by about 30 per cent over the same period. Only in the case of 
Chile and some Brazilian enterprises were there real increases in average 
sales prices. 
For steel enterprises, the prices considered were those quoted on the 
principal market of each country, according to the data published by the 
Latin American Iron and Steel Institute in Anuario Estadístico, 1969. From 
1965 to 1969, real prices of steel products in Buenos Aires decreased by-
proportions ranging from 20 per cent for round bars and zinc-plated rolled 
products to 36 per cent for angles and flat bars. In Sao Paulo, prices of 
rolled products f e l l by about 9 per cent over the same period, but those 
of all other steel products rose by approximately 5 per cent. The drop in 
prices in Mexico City ranged from 4.4 per cent for rolled products to 
17.5 per cent for wire rod, except in the case of bars for construction 
purposes, which showed a slight.increase. In contrast, Santiago, Chile, 
recorded a general rise in steel prices« 
6/ Consumer prices in each country were used as the deflator. 
/From a 
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From a different standpoint, i t is interesting to note the trend 
shown by rates under inflationary conditions. It would seem that the 
general aim is to ¡»prevent increases in rates from contributing to the 
wages-prices spiral, or to keep down the rates for basic services, so that 
they usually rise more slowly than the over-all price index. But this has 
a backlash effect in reducing real income and adversely affecting operating 
results. 
( i i i ) Wages qnd salaries» For want of information on the particular 
situation of each enterprise and on national wage policies, a wages to 
current expenditure ratio was established for the main enterprises in 
selected countries (see tables 5, 6> 7 and 8). One of the general 
characteristics that stands out most clearly from these tables is the small 
share of expenditure accounted for by wages and salaries in petroleum 
enterprises, the high proportion in railway companies, and the extent 
to which the ratio varies in electric pox^ er enterprises. 
(iv) fe^tment. Public enterprises account for a large share of 
public investment and, therefore, of total investment (see table l ) . They 
play a particularly important role in some sectors such as petroleum, 
railways and electric power. For example, the State petroleum enterprises 
in Brazil, Argentina and Mexico absorbed 3.8, 4.4 and 8.2 per cent of total 
i fixed investment, respectively, in the years 1968-1969. As a rule, this 
'Q 
investment is not made regularly every year, since by its very nature it is 
bound to be sporadic, i . e . , whenever any of the existing activities are 
expanded or new activities started. Investment of this fsind has important 
economic effects. First of a l l , as has been shown above and is analysed in 
greater detail in sa'cfcltm III, they play a decisive role in certain key 
sectors of the economy, whose installed capacity is based essentially on 
investment by public enterprises. Iloreover, in addition to current expenditure, 
i t represents considerable purchasing power, which, i f properly co-ordinated, 
could have a decisive effect either on imports or on domestic industry. 
This is particularly significant in the case of capital goods. The purchases 




petroleum, electricity, and steel enterprises are large enough to stimulate 
the operation of a domestic industry for the production of certain goods. 
In fact, there are two alternatives: either the goods are imported, which 
may mean quicker delivery and easier foreign financing terms, or steps 
are taken to promote a domestic industry, with all the multiplier effects 
that this involves® 
Some of the policies adopted may be mentioned in this connexion 
In Brazil^ the machinery requirements of FETROBRAS reactivated the companies 
producing petroleum equipment and led to the merging and reorganization 
of private enterprises; and the orders of State-owned shipping enterprises 
particularly Lloyd irasileiro - helped to promote the activities of 
Brazilian shipyards to a point where, early in 1969, f i f t y ships were 
if 
under construction with a total deadweight tonnage of 484j000»x In 
Argentina, demand from the State railways was of key importance in 
promoting the domestic production of railway equipment by private firms,, 
To sum up, although the solutions to be adopted should be evaluated witiiin 
the context of an over-all plan, i t should be noted that co-ordinated 
purchasing by public enterprises could multiply the effects of the decisions 
adopted. 
(c) Technological policy 
A technological policy covers technological research and the adaptation 
and choice of techniques. One of the salient features of Latin American 
technological policy is the absence of any consistent thinking or action. 
This general observation also embraces public enterprises - and yet, they 
are particularly fitted to do research and adapt techniques. In the f i rst 
place, they are among the largest enterprises, sometimes operating on an 
international scale. It is a well-known fact that considerable economies 
of scale can be achieved in this f ie ld , and that i t is not until enterprises 
have attained a certain size that they can do original research or study 
adaptations of know-how with any degree of independence or hope of success» 
Moreover, since these enterprises do not necessarily have to make profits, . 
they can undertake activities which are of greater benefit to the community 
than to individuals. In particular, the fact that other enterprises may 
2 / See ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1969, Part Three, chapter III« 
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take advantage of the innovations they develop does not hamper progress 
but", on the contrary, helps towards raising the level of technology. This i s 
the opposite approach to that adopted by private enterprises, which try 
to keep for themselves the benefits of every technical improvement they 
introduce'. Furthermore, public enterprises are usually in strategic or 
dominant positions within the economy and thus have a catalyzing effect 
on allied activities. For all these reasons, public enterprises could 
well constitute a key instrument in implementing technological policy, 
provided that the appropriate standards and priorities were established. 
The research can be carried out by the enterprise concerned or by 
a specialized research organization, which may sometimes be another public 
enterprise. To illustrate this point, i t is useful to consider Chile !s 
experience. Research has been undertaken on behalf of different sectors 
of activity for many years now. For example, CORFO carried out experiments 
for i ts mining enterprises; they consisted in treating copper ore oxides 
by flotation and dry sulphurization, thus making i t possible to exploit 
mixed copper ore or copper found in dry areas with a considerable saving 
on sulphuric acid and scrap iron. The Industria Azucarera Nacional, S.-A» 
investigated the uses that could be made of the by—products of i ts alcohol 
dist i l leries , with a view to obtaining a synthesis of different types of 
yeast that would provide products with a high protein content. The Empresa 
Nacional de Semillas carried out experiments in plant-breeding and many 
other enterprises did research in different fields according to their needs. 
Without prejudice to these activities, the Chilean technological institute 
was established in I969 as a subsidiary of CORFO, to operate as a 
technological pool, mainly under research contract with the interested 
enterprises. Under this system the Institute operates as i f i t were 
temporarily the research department of the enterprise concerned® In 
providing this service, the Institute has the advantage of having at its 
disposal multidisciplinary groups of specialists and instruments and 
equipment costing a great deal to purchase and maintain, which can be easily 
moved to wherever they are required. It is at present doing research for 
certain State enterprises in the fields of electronics, engineering, 
chemicals, mining, food, plastics, metallurgy, inorganic chemistry and 
mechanical engineering. 
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Certain variations of the methods that have been tried out by public 
enterprises in Chile are found in other countries, the main difference 
being that the agency responsible for centralizing the research is not a 
legally established enterprise but a decentralized government agency. A 
case in point is the National Institute for Agricultural Technology 
(Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria) in Argentina, which was 
set up in 1956, whose research, among other improvements, led to a 
substantial increase in maize and wheat yields and a revolution in potato 
growing. It also carried out special research projects which were useful 
to the public enterprises» 
From a different standpoint, State enterprises are subjected to 
"technological pressure* from outside, owing to advances in foreign know-how. 
This is very dear - even brutally so - when State enterprises are competing 
in the international market, for instance, when Latin American national 
airlines flying to Europe and the United States have to keep on changing 
their equipment, although the discards are perfectly serviceable and 
adequate for their needs, 
(d) Share of public enterprises in supply; 
The share of public enterprises in the supply of goods and services 
is highly unequal and varies according to the activities concerned. It is 
considerable in the case of public ut i l i t ies , such as electricity supply 
and railway transport, in most of the Latin American countriesc State 
shipping companies have less of a monopoly than railway enterprises, possibly 
because they do not have to face competition from other forms of. transport. 
Nationally-owned, airlines carry about 45 per cent of the total passenger 
t ra f f i c and 40 per cent of the freight. In some countries, State-owned 
petroleum and steel enterprises contribute a significant proportion of 
total supply. The fact that they provide essential inputs is of great 
importance in the implementation of economic policy. On the other hand, 




(e) Role In regulating the market 
Measures to regulate the market mainly affect supply and prices. In 
both these respects* they l i e outside the sphere of competence of the great 
majority of the public enterprises considered* which are mainly concerned 
with infrastructure or activities in which conditions - particularly prices 
are not determined by the free play of market forces but by the decisions 
of - or agreements; between the large enterprises - or by administrative 
decisions (especially in the establishment of rates). Public enterprises 
engaged in manufacturing rarely exercise enough control to regulate the 
market. On the other hand, State enterprises carry more weight in the 
marketing of foodstuffs. The activities of Chile's Agricultural Marketing 
Enterprise (Empresa de Comertio Agricola - ECA), which was established in 
i t s present form* in I960, are a good example of this. Its function is to 
ensure a steady supply of agricultural products and* to that end, to adopt 
the necessary measures to rationalize the marketing system. In order to 
regulate supply, i t purchaser the right quality of at ever products are 
needed on the domestic or external market, stores them in its own cold-storage 
plants, silos and warehouses, and puts them on the market at the right moment 
and at a reasonable price when private sources cannot cope with demand. The 
products usually imported are beef (chilled or frozen, or on the hoof), 
pork and poultry, powdered milk, butter o i l , butter, cheese, wheat, maize, 
rice and potatoes* purchases of which amounted to about 6k million dollars 
in 1967. Another of ECA's functions is to buy products from producers for 
which they cannot find an outlet - especially seasonal crop surpluses -
offering compensatory support prices. Lastly, EXJA is endeavouring to 
rationalize the marketing processi i t has organized many producers1 
co-operatives for this purpose» 
The wine industry in Argentina provides another example of market 
regulation by a State enterprise. Thè largest wine vaults ~ the Gioì 
vaults in Mendoza - are owned by the provincial government, and in 1967 
i t was compelled to purchase 2»5 million quintals of grapes to prevent a 
slump owing to over-production« This cost 300 million pesos, which 
represented a loss in the 1967-1968 financial year. 
/2 . Management 
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2. Management problems 
(a) Integration in the public sector 
The State bodies which carry on ccmmercial and industrial activities 
and which, in that capacity, are called State enterprises, may have the 
legal form of firms managed directly by the State, Public enterprises and , 
corporations, and mixed or semi-public companies in which the State has 
shares. 
State-run firms have no legal personality of their ownj they are 
State-owned and directly responsible to the central government. Public 
enterprises are entirely State-owned but have their own legal personality 
and are subject to public or private law, according to their function. 
Public corporations are organized in a legal form which makes them subject 
to private law; they are limited companies in which the State is the only 
share-holder. lastly, semi-public companies are those in which the State 
and private persons have shares: they normally take the.form of joint-stock 
companies« 
These different kinds of enterprise presuppose different types of 
management or State control and, hence, of integration in the public 
sector. In the f i rst case, that of State-run firms, there is the normal 
hierarchy that prevails in any public administration. Public enterprises 
may be responsible to a ministry or a parent body, which is usually 
responsible for appointing managerial staff and laying down policy guidelines* 
In public corporations, on the other hand, management or control is exercised 
from within the company, through the normal decision-making machinery, 
subject to private law; however, as the State is the only share-holder, 
the managerial staff are appointed by decree or administrative decision. 
This i s also the case for semi-public companies, where, according to the 
extent of State participation, government o f f i c ia ls operate the company 
or have a minority voice in decisionmaking. It i s common in such cases 
for the chief government representative to have the right of veto. The 
government can give itself even greater freedom of action by creating 
different types of shares, reserving certain privileges for those váiich 
it owns • 
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In the cases considered, each enterprise or, from a wider angle, each 
group of enterprises, i s under separate management. Various method© have been 
used to operate a group of enterprises jointly. Ctoe consists in.administrative 
co-ordination, which may range in form from machinery for consultation to 
the setting up of a ministry to control the State enterprises 0 Another 
method consists in the creation of a holding company, which purchases 
share© in the firms that i t wishes to manage or supervise. The State 
body that administers this holding company may be a government department 
or another holding company. The best known case of a. holding company 
which holds other holding companies is- the Institute per la Riconstruzione 
Industriale (IRI) in Italy, which holds shares in enterprises in certain 
industrial sectors and at the same tiiae i s responsible to the ministry 
dealing with State participation in enterprises.-
Mnre recently, the need to make better use of their resources for the 
purpose of maximum expansion has led some of the more powerful enterprises 
to form conglomerates. These group together widely different enterprises 
under a common ownership, with centralized management and a pool of 
financial, technological and human resources which is controlled by the 
8/ IRI policy decisions- are taken by the Council of Ministers and are 
carried out by i ts director®, who are appointed by the President of 
the Republic, the Prime Minister and different administrative 
departments, as the case may be. The managing director is nominated 
by the Chairman of the Board of Directors and i s appointed by executive 
decree.. The group of enterprises controlled by IRI operate through 
a special organization in which control of each branch of activity 
is exercised by a holding company (STET, telephones; Finmare, maritime 
transport; Finsinder, steel; Finmeccanica, metal-transforming; 
Fincantieri, shipbuilding; Finelettrica, electric energy). In addition, 
an important group of enterprises are not controlled by these holding 
companies, such as the banks, (Alitalia, Autostrade, Radiotelevisione 
Italiana, etc . ) . Each holding company holds shares in the companies 
that operate in i t s sector; they appoint the senior staff and decide 
on the policy orientation of subsidiaries in consultation with IRI. 
At the same time, they have sole authority for decisions as to how 
the policies'shall be implemented. To give an idea of the size of 
these holding companies, i t is enough to mention one of them, the 
Società Finanziera Siderurgica (Finsider), 54.1 per cent of whose 
capital is owned by IRI which produces 58 per cent of national steel 
output, through twenty-seven enterprises, including Italsider, Dalmine, 




executive centre in accordance with an over-all plan» Thus, resources 
are concentrated in one centre of power, which decides what new enterprises 
should be set up or purchased, or what new technology is to be employed» 
These conglomerates do not attempt a vertical grouping by sector or 
branch of technology, but are a horizontal grouping of the most diverse 
enterprises, in which financing is the only common link. 
An outstanding example of this type of conglomerate in the Latin 
American context is the Chilean production development corporation, 
CORFO, and i ts eighty-one subsidiaries that operate in the most diverse 
fields (agriculture, fishings wood pulp, mining, metal transforming;, coal, 
communications, films and television, energy, electronics, petroleum, 
petrochemicals, chemicals, construction, steel and metallurgy, tourism, 
and multisectoral support organizations). As a rule, these enterprises 
take the form of limited companies, in which CORFO holds some or all of 
the share capital and appoints a corresponding number of the directors 
(see table 9)# CORFO has used several methods to make these enterprises 
adapt their policies to an over-all or, at least, sectoral approach. The 
f i r s t method is through CORFO!s annual contribution to the budget of each, 
enterprise, since, when the level of this contribution is being considered* 
the proposed programmes are discussed with the enterprise's directors and 
managers* In this way, although actual operations are decentralized, 
CORFO can influence the objectives and the choice of instruments for 
carrying out the plans. Another way in which CORFO can bring i t s 
influence to bear is through the benefits and exemptions i t grants, 
which are of help to the enterprises but cannot be obtained without a 
decision or the consent of CORFO; examples are guarantees for obtaining 
external financing, and the granting of certain exemptions and internal 
loans. Thus, the action of the government appointees on the Boards of 
Directors of the enterprises is important, for they usually receive 
instructions from CORFO about certain basic problems. This i s particularly 
so in respect of policy on prices, wages, investment and loans. These 
relations* and permanent contact with the enterprises, are maintained 
through the management of the CORFO subsidiaries. Lastly, i t should be 
pointed out that fundamental problems of policy and orientation are 
discussed between the executive vice-president of CORFO and the executive 
staff of the enterprises. 
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Forestation. timber and wood pulp 
Po rest ty 
Soo,Agrícola CORFO Ltda. (SACOR) 
Empresa Nacional de Semillas S.A.C. 
Soo. de Construooiones y operaoiones agropecuarias 
S . A . (SOCOAGRO) 
Seo. Leohera Nacional Ltda. (SOLECHE) 
Industria Azuoarera Kaoional (IAHSA) 
Servicie de equipos agrícolas meoanizados (SEAM) 
Empresa Naoional de Frigo r í f iooa (ENAFRI) 
VINEX 
Institut» de Investigaciones agropecuarias 
Empresa Pesquera de Tarapaoá S.A. 
Cía» Pesquera Arauoo S.A« 
Pesquera Iquique S.A. 
Pesqueras Unidas S.A. 
Pesquera Guanaco s .A . 
Pesquera Indo S.A. 
Soo. Pesquera Coloso S.A. 
Maros Chilena S .A.I .C. 
Soo. de Terminales Pesqueras Ltda. (SOTEPE) 
Instituto de Fomenta Pesquere (ÍFOP) 
Soo. Agrícola y Forestal Lebu Ltda. 
Forestal Arauoo Ltda. 
Forestación Kasional S.A. (FOíSSTÁNAC) 
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Table 9 (Cont.2) 
Coaaunloatlona and broadcasting 
Communications 





Petrochemicals anA ehemloala 
Petroleum and petroleum 
produots 
Basle organic ohemlcals 
Baelo lnorganla ohemloals 
Fertilisers 
^ Cenatruotlop fr 
9 Construction materials 
VP 
gT Steal and natal transforming 
I Steel 
Empresa Pasional de Teleoomunioaoiones S.A. (ENTEL) 
Cía de Teléfonos de Chile S.A. 
Estudies Cinematográficos de Chile S.A. "Qiila Filma S. 
Televisión Nacional de Chile S.A. 
Empresa Nacional de Eleotrieidad S.A. (ENDESA) 
Cía. Chilena de Eleotrieidad (CHILECTRA) 
Soo. Gsotéonioa del Tatio S.A. 
B.C.A. S.A. Sleotrtfnloa 
Empresa Electrónica Nacional (E1£CNA) 
Empresa Naelonal de Petróleo (ENAP) 
Petroquímica Chilena S.A. 
Uuímlca Alquil S.A. (ALttüISA} 
Soo. Quíaiaa y Minera de Chile S.A. 
Fábrica de Asido Sulfúrloo S.A. 
Cía. Sudamericana de Fosfatos S.A. (COSAP) 
Soo. Chilena de Fertllitantee Ltda. (SOCHI?) 
Vibr-oe8=at S.A. 
Fábrica da Cemento de Antofogasta 
Compañía de Aoero del feaífleo (CAP) 
Authorized Paid-up Share of capital assets held by the government 
capital capital (percentages) 
a A COrtPO Other public „ „ ^ "ToiaT 
(Millions of escudos 2/ J . COflPO government 
subsidiaries bodies share 
253.0 207.1 0.10 0.22 98.76' 99. ?8 
381.0 31+6.1 - - 2.93 2.93 
0.1 0.1 - 85.63 85.63 
13.7 12.9 20.00 - 60.00 100.00 
800.0 800.0 - - 96.03 96.03 
US$22.0 US$22.0 - - 90.52 90.52 
0.3 0.3 - - 51-00 51.00 
6.5 6.5 - - 33-33 33-33 
8.0 4.2 - - 100.00 100.00 
1 600.0 1 6C0.0 - - 100.00 100.00 
100.0 52.4 1*9,75 - 50.25 100.00 
1.0 ... 10.00 - 10.00 20.00 
USfUo.o US$32.3 - - 3^.25 3U.25 
0.3 0*3 - - 95.60 95.60 
15.0 15.0 .¿» ••• . . . . . . 
0.5 0.5 - 6.25 93.75 100.00 
l.o 0.6 - - 30.48 30.48 
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Currently, CORFO is grouping the enterprises together -according to 
activity, so that their action may be co-ordinated in each sector, under 
a management that establishes general policy, but with each enterprise 
maintaining i t s autonomy of operation. 
In short, i t may be concluded that the legal forms of organization 
of public enterprises vary not only according to needs, but also according 
to the manner in which they were incorporated in the public sector and 
State policy in this respect« The adoption of measures that eliminate 
or lessen the "insularity" of those enterprises and permit their 
co-ordinated action, may mean, depending on the policy of each individxial 
country, anything from an exchange of information and improved communications-
bet ween enterprises to unified management and the pooling of certain 
resources (for instance, financial and technical resources and managerial 
capacity)® 
(h) Some link^ with the private sector 
The links between enterprises in the public and private sectors 
depend essentially on the general environment in which they operate. However, 
to take one particular aspect, i t may be useful to specify certain attitudes 
and value judgements on the part of private entrepreneurs, which vary 
according to the public activity they carry on. For instance, in the 
creation of an infrastructure and provision1 of public ut i l i t ies , there 
is normally complementarity between the public and the private enterprises, 
since these are activities with a strong element of risk, which require 
substantial investment with slow and unprofitable returns - which is why 
the private sector is in favour of State action in this sphere. 
However, when the State enterprises are competitors, particularly 
in commerce and manufacturing, private entrepreneurs may consider this 
an invasion of their territory* The main cause for complaint i s that the 
two types of enterprise are not competing on the same footing, since the 
State, enterprises are not bound to make a profit . In other words, they 
are fighting in the same ring, but one of the opponents is handicapped 




the State enterprises normally* have easy access to financing and sometimes 
that they get tax exemptions» In addition, the action of the State i s 
criticised when i t tries to attract resources through price or tari f f 
9/ control, since this i s a form of capital accumulation.-' 
Whether or not there is a class or group of entrepreneurs in the 
public sector who act as directors or managers for the State "producer" —^ 
and whose behaviour i s supposed to d i f fer from that of private entrepreneurs 
and civil, servants i s a very controversial question. In theory, the fact 
that both public and private enterprises prQduce specific goods and services 
using much the same techniques obliges them to comply with certain 
operational requirements* A steel works, a transport enterprise or an 
electricity plant must produce in a certain way, which does not vary whether 
they are controlled by public or by private interests. But the objectives 
of the two types of enterprise may be very different. In the private 
enterprise, the main goal i s to expand the volume of sales and increase 
profits . In the public enterprise, on the other hand, the motive force 
i s not prof it , but meeting certain standards outlined by the central 
government; for instance, they must supply the right type of goods at 
prices; that are fixed, not necessarily by market requirements, but by 
political decisions^ in many cases. 
Another point of difference is v&ere the managers come from: managers 
of public enterprises are chosen by a governing group according to a 
criterion similar to that used in appointing the heads of government 
departments, i . e . , for their technical ski l l and political suitability. 
But they may have been trained in the private or the public sector. In the 
f i rs t case they give particular attention to management efficiency, which 
2 / In this connexion, see Ignacy Sachs, Patterns of public sector in 
underdeveloped economies (Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1964). 
10/ . See Ricardo Cibotti and Enrique Sierra, El sector piiblico en la 
planificación del desarrollo, Textos del, instituto Latinoamericano 
de HLanj^ f j.cación Económica v Social (Editorial Siglo XXI, Mexico, 
and Editorial Universitaria S.A., Santiago, Chile, 1970). 
/involves precise 
E/CN. 1 2 / 872 
Page 4 7 
involves precis© controls and well-defined tasks; the clearest and most 
exact indicator of such efficiency is the amount of profit made. The 
other case i s that of managers trained in the public sector, generally 
in the same enterprise, whose interests they have at heart. They are not 
generally concerned with financial management and the question of risk, 
and they accept as a citerion for evaluation whether or not th^y have 
carried out the plan, or expanded the enterprise, or met the standards 
of quality for the goods and services produced. 
But perhaps the most outstanding point of contrast i s the nature: 
of the power exercised by the two types of entrepreneur; on the one hand, 
the power of the private entrepreneur i s based on his freedom to do as 
he likes with the profits he generates, which he may use for consumption 
or investment - in the same or in other enterprises - at his discretion. 
On the other hand, the director of a public enterprise cannot do as he 
likes with the earnings of the enterprise, and his job does not depend 
on any possible losses. His power l ies in the size of the staff at his 
command, the importance of the goods he produces and the services he 
provides; but his power is not his own and is not based on ownership«» 
but, in the last analysis, is dependent on a government decision. 
For all these reasons i t may be concluded that the director of a 
public enterprise has characteristics of both the private entrepreneur 
(particularly as regards the actual work he does) and the c ivi l servant 
(as regards the manner of his appointment, the objectives and nature of 
his powers); but that, when all i s said and done, he is more an o f f i c ia l 
than he is a captain of industry. 
/ I l l , IMPACT 
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III . IMPACT OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IK THE MAJOR SECTORS 
IN WHICH THEY OPERATE 
The brief over-all view presented in table 4 indicates the dominance 
of public enterprise in sectors of the economy related to the infrastructure 
and the supply of certain services and inputs. The following sections will 
describe in broad outline the role played by public enterprises in rai l , 
maritime and air transport and in the petroleum, electric power and steel 
sectors. As the intention is not to discuss the over-all operation of 
these sectors but rather to indicate the role of public enterprise in 
them, the sections that follow will be confined to describing the relative 
importance of public enterprises in each sector of activity and the 
financial results of their operations, 
(a) Relative importance 
In Latin America, virtually all rail transport is in the hands of 
State enterprises. Argentina, Brazil and Mexico head the l i s t , each with 
between 25,000 and 28,000 million technical traf f ic u n i t s , ^ followed by 
Chile (4,600 million) and, in descending order, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay 
(ranging between 1,500 and 1,000 million). 
The only private enterprise in all these countries is the Peruvian 
Corporation Limited, with 610 million TTU (see table 10). In the other 
countries of .£he region, rail transport is of relatively small importance 
and the TTU figures are not very significant. 
In order to gauge the relative importance of railway systems, i t is 
useful to look at total operating costs and the number of staff employed, 
since capital costs vary a great deal from year to year. Railway operating 
costs in Argentina and Mexico range between 17 and 18 per cent of general 
government consumption expenditure, while in Chile the corresponding 
figure is 12 per cent, in Brazil 9 per cent and in Colombia 5»5 per cent. 
11/ Technical t ra f f i c units (TTU) are equal the sum of ton/kilometres 





LATIN AMERICA: EMPLOYMENT WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY 
IN THE RAILWAY SYSTEMS 
Staff Average TTU pel 
tear 
employed wage person 
(thous- (dollars at (thous-
ands; I960' prices) ands) 
Argentina 1950 189 1 792 155 
I960 211 1 607 146 
1968 156 1 649 177 
Bolivia 1968 6 1 043 98 
Brazil 1950 200 892 92 
1960 204 1 135 128 
1968 157 1 206 166 
Colombia 1950 U 96 
I960 11 1 189 130 
1968 11 1 572 131 
Chile 1950 22 2 579 187 
I960 25 2 948 157 
1968 24 2 502 183 
Mexico 1952-54 86 • • * 165 
I960 69 1 719 263 
1968 80 2 436 313 
Source; ECLA, El Transporte en América Latina (United Nations public ation, 
Sales N°r 65.II.G.7)* Asociación Latinoamericana de Ferrocarriles 




The labour force employed by railway enterprises ranges from close to 
160,000 in Argentina and Brazil, to 80,000 in Mexico, 24,000 in Chile 
and slightly more than 11,000 in Colombia. The comparatively small 
size of the labour force employed in the Mexican railway system - half 
that of Argentina and Brazil with roughly the same traf f i c level - is due 
to differences in the ratio of freight ton/kilometres to passenger/kilometres, 
which is 5 to 1 in Mexico whereas in the other countries i t is roughly equal, 
(b) Financial results of operations 
Around 1950, the financial balance on operations of the Latin American 
railways began to move into the red. Contributory factors included failure 
to renew equipment, in good time and insufficient expenditure on maintaining 
equipment and tracks, together with policies to maintain rates at low 
levels and competition from other means of transport. Furthermore, the 
railways were on occasion used as a means of creative employment, which 
helped to swell operating costs. 
In i960, the operating coefficient (ratio of operating costs to 
12/ 
operative income}-— expressed as a percentage was close to 200 in Brazil 
and Uruguay, over I5O in Argentina and Chile, and between 111 and 116 in 
the remaining countries. Two years later, the situation had worsened 
appreciably, and the coefficient had risen to above 250 in Brazil, and 
Uruguay, above 200 in Argentina and Chile, while in Colombia, Mexico and 
Peru i t remained fairly low (between 124 and 134) # A comparison of these 
figures with those for I968 shows that there had been a definite improvement. 
In Brazil, the coefficient had returned to its I96O level (192), but in 
Uruguay i t had remained extremely high (233), while in Argentina, Chile 
and Mexico i t had not moved from the relatively high level of 143» In 
Peru, the financial situation of the railways had not varied a great deal, 
and only Colombia had been able to achieve an operating surplus (see 
table 11), 
12/ Subsidies and other income not connected with operations was 
excluded from operating income; and expenditure on renewals of 
equipment was not included under operating expenditure. 
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Table 11 
UT IN AMERICA s FINANCIAL RESULTS OF OPERATIONS OF THE RAIUÌAY SYSTEM 
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Colombia Chile Peru Mesico Uruguay 
Operating Coefficients S/ 
lS*i5 81 .6 4 « . 96*6 ¿9*3 99-2 102.0 9 . « 
l?50 123.8 8 1 . 6 136,0 103.2 136.9 10^.2 IOI .9 13^.6 
1355 127.9 9 1 . 2 159.9 110.2 151O 102.7 I23.2 I93.I 
1960 156.9 192.0 112.7 153*6 111.0 116.2 I87.9 
17M • •• 228.0 112.4 179.0 120.9 128.5 228.3 
1962 207.0 ... 260.1 1?6.0 203.2 12U.1 I33.8 253.1+ 
196a l^f.O 110.0 192.0 92.O Htf.O 135-0 1^3-0 2:33.0 
Percentage variation 1960-1968 exs »ressed In real terms 
Operating e^pendltur e - 2 6 . 0 ... -16.0 t 2 2 . 0 -15.0 ttf.O -9.0 
Operating Income -20.0 ... - 1 6 . 0 -8.0 - 2 7 . 0 +3.0 -27 .O 
Surplus of deficit -38.O . . . - 1 6 . 0 -27.O +130*0 t i7U.o 411,0 
Souroe: As for table 10« 
a / Ratio of operating costs to operating Income, multiplied by 100« Subsidies and other 
lnoorne not connected with operations vas excluded from operating Income; expenditure 
on renewals of equipment vas not Included under operating expenditure« 




The data given above reflect the position of the main railway systems 
in each country and not the individual situation of some enterprises or 
lines that may be in quite a different financial position. For example, 
the most important railway enterprise in Brazil, the Rede Ferroviaria 
Federal S.A.> had an operating coefficient of 186 in 1968; in Peru the 
State railways had a coefficient in 186 in 1968; in Peru, the State 
railways had a coefficient in I968 (including equipment renewal costs) 
of 135, while the Peruvian Corporation Limited was virtually in balance. 
It is d i f f i cu l t to make an objective appraisal of the operating 
def i c i ts represented by coefficients: of above 100 in the various countries. 
One method is to compare the absolute values of deficits with operating 
costs. In Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, the def ic i t amounts to about half 
the operating costs, and in Argentina, Mexico and Peru i t ranges from 26 
to 30 per cent. Taking another yardstick, the deficit0as a proportion 
of total general government consumption expenditure gives a figure of 
between 16 and 18 per cent in Argentina, Chile and Mexico, and 9 per cent 
in Brazil. These figures show the seriousness of the financial position 
of the railways and i ts impact on increases in government expenditure 
under the head of transfers. 
The following paragraphs will describe developments that have 
either improved or worsened the financial situation of railway enterprises 
between i960 and 1 9 6 8 . ^ 
It is clear from table U that during the period 1960-1968 three 
of the seven countries considered reduced their operating defxcit 
For purposes of comparison, the average values and prices for I968 
were deflated using cost-of-living indexes, with i960 taken as the 
base year at 100. For Mexico the implicit price deflator of the 
gross domestic product was used. The ratio of technical traf f i c 
units to labour employed was taken arbitrarily as an indicator of 
labour productivity. This indicator becomes less meaningful as the 
.difference between the two types of t ra f f i c increases. For example 
in Mexico average productivity per employed person is 1.8 times 
greater than in Argentina, owing to the fact that, as noted above, 




over the period, three increased i t and only Colombia achieved a surplus. 
Contributory factors were rate trends and changes in the proportions of 
freight and passenger traf f i c (see table 12). Of particular importance 
the expenditure side, owing to i ts large share of the total, was expenditure 
on the wage b i l l owing to changes in the number of persons employed and in 
average real wages» Expenditure for maintenance, fuel and electrical 
energy generally rose less rapidly than the wage b i l l . 
In the three countries that reduced their operating deficits* there 
were reductions in real terms in freight rates: 15 per cent in Argentina, 
12 per cent in Brazil and 25 per cent in Chile. The effect on operating 
income, however, t;as to some extent of fset , especially in Argentina where, 
in addition to a real increase of 29 per cent in passenger rates, the ratio 
of freight income to passenger income fe l l from 2.9si in I960 to 1.7:1 in 
1968. In Brazil and Chile, passenger rates f e l l by 4.2 and 23.8 per cent 
respectively, and in neither country was there a change in the structure 
of income. 
The reduction of expenditure was made possible by a sharp cutback 
in the labour force in Argentina and Brazil, accompanied by a relatively 
small rise in average real wages. In Chile, where the labour force shrank 
only slightly, real wages f e l l by 15 per cent. 
Colombia's surplus was due to a sharp increase in real passenger rates 
(68 per cent), accompanied by stagnation in real terms of freight rates, 
with the ratio of freight to passenger traf f i c remaining constant. The 
relatively smaller increase in expenditure was due inter alia to a 
32 per cent rise in average wages, with the size of the labour force 
remaining roughly at its^ i960 level. 
In the countries where the operating deficit increased^ there was 
a sharp decline - about 30 per cent - in real freight rates, accompanied 
in Peru and Uruguay by an equal or greater decline in passenger rates 
(46 per cent). In Mexico, passenger rates declined comparatively less 
(8 per cent), but total income in respect of freight was almost ten times 
that for passengers. The labour force rose by 16 per cent between I960 





LATIN AMERICA: TRAFFIC AND AVERAGE INCOME 
IN THE RAILWAY SYSTEMS 
Commercial traf f i c Unit income 
Freight Passengers Per ton/km. Per pass./km. Year 
(Millions (Millions (Thousandths of dollar at 
of ton/knu) of pass./km.) I960 prices) a / 
Argentina 1950 16 120 13 104 13.7 7.9 
I960 15 158 15 685 13.5 4» 5 
1962 10 913 ... 12.0 e <» . 
1968 12 778 14 853 1 1 . 0 5.8 
Bolivia 1968 311 248 25.4 7.7 
Brazil 1950 8 267 10 093 18.5 5.1 
I960 12 820 15 395 8.9 2.4 
1968 12 997 13 173 7.8 2.3 
Colombia I960 768 598 20.5 4.7 
1968 1 125 351 20.7 7.9 
Chile 1950 2 161 1 956 20.0 9.0 
I960 2 025 1 900 28.1 10.1 
1968 2 331 2 071 2 1 . 0 7.7 
Mexico I960 14 004 4 128 13.1 5.0 
1968 20 654 4 398 9.6 4.6 
Peru I960 529 282 32.0 9.5 
1968 567 224 22.0 7.2 
Uruguay I960 399 535 21.4 5.9 
1968 415 663 14.9 3.2 
Source: As for table 10. 
a/ Deflated using consumer price indexes (except for Mexico, where the 
implicit price deflator of the gross domestic product was used) 
and converted into dollars at purchasing power parity exchange rates» 




2« Shipping companies 
Table l j gives an over-all picture of Latin America1 s merchant f leet 
with a break-down by State and private shipping companies. It shows that 
Argentina and Brazil> with the largest national f leets , together account 
for 57 per cent of all Latin American tonnage. Chile, Colombia and 
E c u a d o r C u b a , Mexico and Venezuela form a second group, with 34 per cent 
of total tonnage, most of the remaining 9 per cent being taken up by Peru 
and Uruguay (8 per cent). At the same time, i t should be borne in mind 
that Latin American national-flag ships carry only a small percentage 
of each country*s total maritime freight; table 14 illustrates this, 
point by indicating the freights earned by national and by foreign ships. 
Taking only ships of 1,000 gross registered tons or over, the 
thirty-three State-owned f leets account for nearly 60 per cent of Latin 
America's over-all tonnage, while the 124 privately-owned f leets represent 
only 40 per cent. Moreover, except in Uruguay and Venezuela, the average 
age of the State-owned fleets is lower in eveiy country. 
Of the total State-owned f leets alone, 63.5 per cent is in Brazil 
and Argentina, followed by Cuba and Mexico with 20.6 per cent. Further 
down the scale come Chile, Colombia and Ecuador, and Venezuela, with much 
lower shares and a predominantly privately-owned f l ee t . 
Table 15. l i s t s Latin America's thirty biggest shipping companies. 
Hère again, i t can be seen that the bulk of the total f leet i s State—owned 
since the seventeen private shipping companies: mentioned account for only 
one third of the total tonnage of the thirty enterprises. 
1 / / For recent trends in Latin American maritime tx^ansport, particularly 
the shipping policies adopted, see ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin 
America. 1969. Part Three, chapter III* 
l£ / In view of the fact that most ships flying the Panamanean flag are 
not Latin-American-owned, the f leet registered in Panama has riot 
been taken into consideration. 
16/ Owing to the size of the Grancolombiana merchant f l eet , which is 
jointly pwned by Colombia and Ecuador, these two countries are 
usually taken together. 
/Table 13 
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Table 13 
UTIN AMERICA: SHARE OP STATE-OWNED SHIPPING COMPANIES IN THE TOTAL 
MERCHANT FI£ET AT I DECEMBER I969 a / 
Gross registered tonnage 
Number Average Absolute Percentage 
Shipping company of age figures ©f total 
unite (years) national 
e f leet 
Argentina 
Empresa Líneas Marítimas Argentinas 45 I7.8 325 OI3 3I.I 
Yaolmlentos Petrolíferos Fiscales 25 I8.4 210 177 20.1 
Ministerio de Defería Nacional 11 21.4 41.-388 4.0 
Flota Fluvial del Estado Argentino 13 9.O 34 671 3-3 
Empresa Ferrocarriles del Estado Argentino 6 37.* 12 459 1.2 
Yacimientos Carboníferos Flsoales 2 25éO 6 691 0+7 
Total State-owned 102 18.2 630 399 60.4 
Total privately-owned 81 21 .3 413 501 39*6 
Over-all total I83 19 .5 1 043 900 100.0 
Brazil 
Fronape (PETROffiAS) Up 9 . 9 420 142 3^.3 
Lloyd Brasileiro 69 1 3 . 6 373 524 3 0 . 6 
Ministerio de Marinha 6 .. 14.8 22 068 1.8 
Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional 2 14.0 16 453 1*3 
Empresa de Navegaba© Amazónica 7 12.4 9 238 0 . 8 
Total State-owned 124 11.8 841 425 6 8 . 9 
Total privately-owned 92 14.7 380 552 3 1 . I 
Over-all total 216 12 .7 1 221 977 100.0 
Chile 
Ministerio de Defensa Nacional 5 10.0 31 720 1 2 . 1 
Empresa Marítima del Estado 9 12.1 21 486 8 . 3 
Total State-owned 14 10.9 53 206 20 .5 
Total privately-owned 28 12.9 205 985 79.5 
Over-all total 42 12.5 259 191 100.0 
Colombia/Ecuador 
Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Colombia 5 8.7 46 588 1 9 . 4 
Flota Bananera Eouato riana 2 1 . 0 13 250 5*5 
Concesión de Salinas (Banoo de la 
República de Colombia) 2 1.5 3 956 1.7 
Navenal 2 16.8 2 989 1.3 
Total State-owned . 11 7.1 66 783 27.9 
Total privately-owned 30 8.9 172 332 7 2 . I 
Over-all total 4i 8.4 239 115 100.0 
/Table I3 (eont») 
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Table 13 (oont.) 
Gross registered tonnage 












Empresa Consolidada de Navegación Mantisa 39 9*8 229 3&0 94.0 
Flota Cubana de Pasca 7 9 094 3.7 
Empresa Consolidada del Petríle© 2 11.7 ** 579 1.9 
Empr:sa Consolidada del Cemento 1 40.0 1 039 
Over^all total 1*9 9.7 09* 100.« 
Dominican Bepubllo 
Flota Mercante Doninioana 















Flota Mercante Gran Centroamericana 9.5 3 6 2 9 100.0 
He:iioo 
Pemex 
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Flota Mercante del Estado 14 7.5 15 713 100.0 
Perú 
Compañía Peruana de Vapores 
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Anoap 3 23*0 22 719 18.0 
Mlnlsterio de Defensa Naolonal 1 7.0 18 584 14.7 
Administracitfn Naolonal do Puerto s 3 31.6 15 878 12.6 
Total State-owned 7 20*1 57 181 45.3 
Total prlvatoly«owned 11 17.9 69 009 54.7 
Over-all total 18 18-9 126 190 100.0 
Venezuela 
C,A. Venezolana de Mavegaoi6n 12 13*7 45 726 14.7 
Total privât sly-owned 23 11.9 264 703 85.3 
Over-all total 35 12.1 310 429 100.0 
latin Âme rlca 
Total etate^ovned (33 shipping companies) 380 12*8 2 317 411 58.5 
Total privately-owned (124 shipping companies) 294 15.8 1 641 277 41.5 
Over-all total 674 13*9 3 958 686 100.0 
Source» Xnstituto de Estudios de la Marina Mercante Iberoamericana, la. Marina Mercante 
Iberoomerleana. Buenos Aires, 1969* 
a/ Only self-propelled ship? of 1,000 gross registered tons or ever* 
b/ The Eouadorlan Government has a minority holding in the F.M. Granoolonblana, whioh is a 
private enterprise* It owns 24 ships with a total registered tonnage of 158 915» 
I . e . , 66.5 per oent of the total eombined tonnage of Colombia and Ecuador* 
/Table 14 
Tabla l4 
LATIN AMERICA : M A R I T I M E FREIGHTS I N FOREIGN T R A D E , 1967 
Total Total ' T o t a l Total _ , , Total Total Percentage 
freight earned ^ freight earned _ Over-all earned earned earned e " Per0 en- on ^ 6y , Per0 en- -- total ?y , A by on py . . b b . ^ çy imports national tage exports rational tage f r ci ¿ i t s national foreign national 
f l a g ships f l a g ships & f l a g ships shipfT f l a g ships 
Millions of dol lars Millions of dol lars Millions of dollars 
S o* 
H V/» 
Argentina 99.8 24.9 25 W . 8 1 8 . 0 99 299.6 42.9 256.7 14 
Bolivia I9.3 m 2 0 , 0 - 39.3 - 39*3 -
Brazil * 219.7 93.3 »+2 2 0 7 . 0 33.6 16 H 2 6 . 7 1 2 6 . 9 299*8 3 0 
Colombia 42.0 11.4 27 1 0 1 . 0 5 .2 5 143.0 1 6 . 6 126.4 12 
Costa Rica 17.2 1.4 8 35.0 0.8 2 52.2 2 . 2 5 0 . 0 4 
Chile 68.5 1 7 . 0 25 9 3 . 0 1 2 . 1 13 1 6 1 . 5 2 9 . I 132.4 18 
Ecuador 17«3 4 .2 24 52.7 3.0 6 7 0 . 0 ' 7 .2 6 2 . 8 10 
£1 Salvador I9.O - - 1 8 . 0 - - 37.0 - 3 7 . 0 
Guatemala I9.7 - - 1 8 . 0 0 .1 . 1 37.7 0 . 1 37.6 
Haiti 3-8 - - 3.5 « 7.3 - ' 7 .3 
Honduras 14.3 0.6 1+ 5 6 . 0 0 . 2 tm 7 0 . 3 0 . 8 69.5 1 
Mexico 53.0 12.0 23 1 5 0 . 0 8 . 0 5 203.0 2 0 . 0 1 8 3 . 0 10 
Nicaragua 27.4 4.8 Id 1 5 . 5 2.1 l4 >+2.9 6.9 3 6 . 0 16 
Panama 21*2 - •• 5 0 . 5 9» - 7 1 . 7 - 71.7 •» 
Paraguay 9.7 3 . 0 31 9.9 1.8 18 . 1 9 . 6 4 .8 14.8 24 
Peru $9.0 1 3 . 0 19 1 5 7 . 0 5 . 0 3 2 2 6 . 0 1 8 . 0 208.0 8 
Dominican àepubllo I6.5 - . m 2 2 . 0 3 . 8 17 3 8 . 5 3.8 34.7 10 
Uruguay 26 .O 9.7 37 l l . o 1.7 15 3 7 . 0 11.4 25.6 31 
Venezuela 82.0 1 9 * 2 23 7 0 0 . 0 1+1.8 6 7 8 2 . 0 6 1 . 0 7 2 I . O 8 
Total 845.4 214.5 21 1 919-? 137.2 2 2 765O 351.7 .2 413.6 11 
Total f o r ALALC countries 
(excluding Bolivia) 687*0 207.7 22. 1 681*4 130.2 8 2 368.4 337.? 2 030.5 14 
Source: For A L A L C countries, excluding Bolivia, 0 A 3 / a L A L C Transport Programme» For other countries, International Monetary Fund and 
£ £ L A estimates* 
•tJW 
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LATIN AMERICAí THE THIRTY BIGGEST SHIPPING COMPANIES IN ORDER OP GROSS 
REGISTERED TONNAGE â / AT 1 JANUARY 
State-owned Gross Average 
Shipping company and oountry or Units registered age 
privately owned tonnage (years) 
PRONAPE (Brazil) State 4o 420 1-+2 9.9 
Lloyd Braslieiro (Brazil) State 69 373 524 13. s 
ELMA (Argentina) State 45 325 013 17.8 
PEMEX (Mexico) State 21 230 574 5.9 
Empresa Consolidada de Navegación MAMBISA (Cuba) State 39 ¿29380 9.8 
YPP (Argentina) : State 25 210 177 18.4 
Flota Mercante Gran Colombiana 
8„3 (C«l©mbla/£ouador) b / Private 21+ 158 915 
Creole Petroleum (Venezuela) Private 6 117 254 io„5 
Compañía Shell do Venezuela (Venezuela) Private 6 104 216 11.4 
Compañía Sudamericana de Vapores (Chile) Private 10 ' ?5 3^4 7»7 
PETRQMAR (Argentina) Private 10 76 009 1 8 . 7 
Navegado Mercantil S.A Navem y etros (Bratil) Private 5 i-j 400 1 . 2 
Estrella Marítima (Argentina) Private 9 64 523 17.7 
Compañía Peruana de Vapores (Peru) State 7 57 304 8 . 1 
Ministerio de Marina (Peru) State 9 51 089 14.5 
SONAP (Chile) Private 3 50 716 15®4 
tañíste rio de Defensa Nacional (Colombia) State 5 46 >88 8.7 
CAVN (Venezuela) State 12 45 726 13.7 
Transportadora Marítima Mexicana (Mexico) Private 12 44 155 12.9 
Navegapao NETUMAR (Brasil) Private 9 43 113 8 . 3 
Ministerio de Defensa Nacional (Argentina) State 11 4l 388 21.4 
LIBRA (Brazil) Private 14 38 323 13.0 
La Naviera (Argentina) Private 8 37 642 27.4 
GOTAAS LARSEN (Argentina) Private 3 37 508 21.0 
ASTRAMAR (Argertina) Private 3 35 845 16.4 
EFFDEA (Argentina) State 13 34 671, 9.0 
TRANSMARITIMA del Plata (Argentina) Private 2 31 967 22*3 
Ministerio de Marina (Chile) State 5 31.720 10.0 
Frota Ooeanloa Braslleira (Brazil) Private 2 3 0 2 3 8 1.5 
ESSO Uruguay (Uruguay) Private 1 29 139 11 .0 
SUMMAiffí 
Percentage of total GKT, 
Units GOT. ef the thirty biggest 
shipowners 
State shipping companies ( 1 3 ) 3OI 2 097 476 66.4 
Private shipping companies (17) 127 1 060 733 33-6 
TOTAL y a mmBmm Ì I?» 203 100.0 
Sources As for table 13« t 
a/ Only self-propelled ships of 1 000 grU or over* 




From 1964 to 1969.» the total gross registered tonnage of Latin 
America's merchant f leet rose by 10 per cent, despite a reduction in the 
number of ships in operation (see table 16). Most of this increase can 
be ascribed to private shipowners, since the public sector's share dropped 
from 6l',9 per cent to 58,5 per cent. The same general trend is apparent 
in all the countries, except for Chile and Colombia/Ecuador - two .of, the 
fleets with the largest proportion of privately-owned ships. There has 
however been l i t t l e enough change and the relative proportions of public 
and private ownership have not altered greatly, except in Uruguay where the 
share 6f the State-owfted f l ee t declined from 65 to 45 per cent of the 
total during the period under consideration; on the other hand, the share 
of Government-owned shipping increased substantially in Chile (from 15 to 
20 per cent) and in Colombia and Ecuador (from 11 to 28 per cent). 
The fastest-growing f leet was Cuba's, which i s entirely State-owned 
from the eighth largest Latin American merchant f leet and i t moved up to 
sixth place, and from fourth to third place in the State-owned f leet . 
The major role played by the State in Latin America's maritime 
transport is further illustrated by the fact that orders; for new 
government-owned ships represented 60 per cent of the total tonnage 
under construction or on order at 1 January 1969 (see table 17). In 
this connexion, i t is worth noting that the Brazilian Goverment has 
continued to enlarge i t s merchant f leet which accounted for 65 per Cent 
of the total tonnage ordered by Brazil. As regards the ratio of tonnage 
under construction or on order to the existing tonnage of State-owned 
ships, the most striking cases are Chile and Peru, whose rate of renewal 





fH Pi ts KN 
• • • • « • n 0\ n oo cm vo l-t i 0"\ cm 
« J VO H O • • • 9 • if\ ir\ n o h j- in <H cs os 1 
a u fi t. s 
2<s 
&. 
h f\co j 
• o • • rj «-< cs us 1 in ^ j- l n l co 
£ g 
J- n o ^ 
»> » • • * • « N « N IP 
•-} I N cj ON J I OA I 
<S J 
PMf»\i OS O N 00 
Ä A A A A A fi 
a 
a 
cm cm <m cm 
>-i ps rt o os CO 
oo h h co n h rt »4 PA OS 
§1 
rl N in « O IfiO us UN os os 
CS O lis C4 Q oo o ts if <r\ cm r-t 
co on s^ n os o O K JON CM op OS d- rt 
I CM I J H . I N rt n Jt, 
n 
* t •a * > a a v a a a a a a a a £ X £<8 <k £ £ £ & && 
g\ in vo n d cs on us so os cm o co os so n o h CN ¿t N N O i v i tM r* 
o H i es jS- us so j: so oo « 
s cs pm v9 ih os oo cm N H N 
ol N rt rt i1 CM f-l <-M H CO rH Oil 
+» -g H i x je ä « « ^ a « a cl S I i-l H H 
HOflOMmnssH o\us. SO CM N D U\ IT> N CM OS NO . O ovcoÄSO^NNn' OfiOOSsOPSOS^ -OSOSOSSOVO -i 
Sh co n n h is . h j 8\ n o h n h h f* rt w vo 
vo SO CM ITS CM in CM ON J O SO J rH OS US CS (TV CM rt rS rt CM CM 
H 
b 
O H H K «-< us j" jt ¿r crs us 
0o o cq oo <-• us os r-1 j in n h 
I J\ O J § s 
CM Ji" o\ es c\ 
ft i r-t i i os co cs 
i t s r i 
ri n Mn in so os us isin h j us 
f* >"l_rM, US>0 *•« . PS - OS PS ,r* CM CM, O vo J rf M H jf rt rt vo i NCO r-l r-» «-< 
CS OS CM J- CM CO Zt CM «—i CO 
§ 5 3 
/Table 1? 
Table 17 
LATIN AMiRICA: SHIPS UNBiR CONSTRUCTION OK ON OROiH BY STATE AMD PRIVATE SHIPPING COMPANIES AT 1 JANUARY I969 a / 
Units 
State shipping ooapan'ias 
Grt Peroentage of total Grt Units 
Private shipping companies 
Grt Peroentage of total Ort 
Total 
Units Grt 
Rate of renewal b / 
State shipping companies 
shipping compania Total 
Argentina 6 35 300 68.8 4 16 000 31.2 10 51 300 5.6 4.0 4.9 
Brazil 25 573 200 65.0 44 308 844 35.O 69 882 o44 68.1 81.2 72.2 
Chile 6 66 000 100.0 - - « 6 66 000 124.0 - 25.5 
Colombla/Eouador - - - 2 21 000 100.0 2 21 000 - 12.2 8.8 
Cuba 3 36 000 100.0 - - 3 36 000 14.7 - 14.7 
Dominican Republio - - - - - - - - - -
Guatemala - - - - « - - - - - -
Mexico 2 16 750 22.2 5 58 700 77.8 7 75 450 7.2 II8.6 26.7 
Nioaragua - - - - - - - - - - -
Paraguay - - - - - - - - - - . -
Peru 12 112 6l6 ' 100.0 - - 12 112616 103.9 - 60.0 
Uruguay 1 20 000 100.0 - - - 1 20 000 35.0 - 15.8 
Venezuela - - - 6 164 280 100.0 i 164 280 - 62.1 52.9 
Total 31 859 866 60.2 61 568 824 39.8 116 1 428 690 37.1 34.7 36.1 
Souroe: As for table 13. 
y Only self-propelled ships of 1,000 Grt or oyer. 
\ b/ Rate of renewal s under CQnstruotlon or ordered x 100 












3» Mrl ines 
(a) Relative importance of State and private.._airllnes 
In nearly al l the Latin American countries, the public sector shares 
air transport with the private sector. Of the fourteen largest air transport 
companies in the region - there are also a multitude of small companies, 
generally privately owned - half are privately run and carry close to 
55 per cent of the passenger t r a f f i c and about 60 per cent of the freight. 
Of the largest State-run enterprises, mention should be made of Aerolíneas 
Argentinas, which has a volume o f t r a f f i c o f 1.6 million passengers/kms 
and 44 million ton/kins of f re ight , and Aeronaves de México, with 1.4 and 
nearly 18 million passenger/kms and ton/klma, respectively. The volume 
of passenger t r a f f i c on VIASA and LAN i s about 670,000 passenger/km; 
the volume of freight, however, exceeds that o f the Mexican airline (see 
table 18). 
As regards the operational features of the largest airlines in 
the region, as a rule there are no differences between the public and 
private airlines except, of course, in the case of domestic f l ights and 
stopping points which State airl ines sometimes maintain, although they 
run at a l oss , f or social reasons or to draw the country together® Both 
types of airline have domestic and international f l i ghts . Aerolíneas . 
Argentinas (State-run) and VARIG (privately owned) run mostly international 
f l i gh ts . In other cases, State enterprises such as Cubana de Aviación, 
LAN and Aeronaves de Mexico, and AVIANCA, which i s privately owned, have 
about a3 mar$r foreign as domestic f l i ghts . 
The secondary airlines - whether private or State-owned - mostly 
operate domestic f l i ghts . This i s the case of Cruzeiro do Sul and VASP 





LATIN AMERICA: TRAFFIC OP SELECT£2 AIRLINES, BY COUNTRY, 1969 SCHEDULED SERVICES, 
DOMESTIC AND INTERNACIONAL 0 / 
Kilometres 
Traffie 





f DaoaAmnan / Freight . Total 0 / (per-^ « CbB B QllgOr/ 
km) (ton/km) (ton/km) cent» 
(Thousands) 
age} 
Argentina 42 500 1 96I 510 60 780 248 73O 58.Ó 
Aerolíneas Argentinas s 31 786 1 614 966 44 I67 201 343 52.8 
Brasil 92 400 3 913 510 135 700 466 710 56.0 
Varig Pr 48 137 2 503 538 I23 945 346 651 58.I 
Cruzeiro Do Sul Pr 18 335 682 015 7 335 62 4o4 54.6 
Viaoao Airea Sao 
Paulo (VASP) S 17 273 550 544 5 607 47 627 53.1 
Colombia 46 48o 1 775 490 69 810 231 830 59.O 
Avianoa Pr 31 162 1 407 712 52 354 185 438 59-6 
Costa Rica 4 810 124 44o 8 850 20 040 69.O 
L&osa d / S • •• 86 200 0 / 8 148 15 897 68.9 
Cuba 6 600 345 090 7 46o 37 430 84.0 
Cubana de Aviación S 7 288 445 613 7 999 47 560 87.4 
Chile 19 060 655 730 62 750 133 990 49.0 
Línea Airea Naolonal 
(LAN) S 14 935 667 853 27 491 89 080 58.3 
Ecuador 9 n o 2X6 624 e / 4 950 25 070 57.0 
Ecuatoriana da 
Aviación d / Pr 7 930 y 189 100 «/ 3 585 21 150 61.4 
M&doo 50 590 2 884 24o 4o 760 288 230 49.0 
Aeronaves de rt&cioo S 25 459 1 400 100 17 657 14o 921 47.4 
Mexicana de Aviación P* 19 395 i 164 817 13 077 113 749 51.8 
Perú 18 430 694 48o 17 210 79 190 51.0 
Aerolíneas Peruanas 
(APSA) Pr lo 828 647 632 10 119 69 741 50.7 
Trinidad y Tobago 8 990 4l8 450 8 24o 43 920 34.0 
British West Indies 
Airways Pr 8 681 416 611 8 303 44 161 33.5 
Vehezuela 28 870 995 070 39 330 131 o4o 42.0 
VIASA - Venezolana 
Internacional S 13 450 683 300 4o 323 106 810 41.7 
Línea Aeropostftl 
Venezolana S • •• 137 040 3 / 1 951 14 394 45.2 
Aerovías 
Venezolanas d / Pr • • • 161 350 e / 3 222 17 672 43.7 
Latín America f / 369 350 15 2O2 6l4 502 180 1 863 130 -
Souroes: International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Development of Civil Air Transport» Tral'fio 
Statistics , February 1J70« 
International Air Transport Assooiation (IATA), World Air Transport Statistics, 1969, 
a / In same oases, the figures for Individual airlines are higher than those for the country oonoarned, 
owing to discrepancies between the two sources used. 
b / S3 State-owned; Pr. Private, 
0 / In addition to passengers and frei^vfc, includes baggage and mail, 
d / Figures for 1968. 
9/ Estimates. 
t f Covsra the twecty-three countries of the region* 
/ ( b ) Financial 
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(b) Financial results 
The major airlines of the region - both public and private - are not 
usually very profitable concerns, f or several reasons. First , the airlines 
that run domestic services as a rule - though not always - have to keep 
their fares relatively low, either to attract business or to keep them 
in l ine with domestic prices«, The rates on their international f l ights 
are normally fixed by international agreements and with these earnings, 
they have to make good any de f i c i t on domestic services, in addition to 
paying their current operating costs. This means that i f the airline i s 
to operate at a pro f i t , costs must be reduced to a minimum. 
Of a total of thirteen airlines considered, four run at a l oss : 
Aerolíneas Argentinas, Cruzeiro do Sul, APSA and LAN; the losses of the 
last two are very heavy, and LAN, in particular, has a d e f i c i t of 40 per 
cent on i t s sales f igures. Another f ive enterprises have made somewhat 
meagre prof i ts of between 2.6 and 4.1 per cent of sales; VARIG, AVIANCA, 
VIASA, Aeropostal Venezolana and LACSA of Costa Rica; and only four 
airlines made what may be called a satisfactory pro f i t , equivalent to 
about 8 per cent of sales: Ecuatoriana de Aviación, Aeronaves de México 
(State-owned), Aerovías Venezolanas and SAHSA of Honduras. 
Income from sales per unit transported appears to have, been a 
factor only in the large losses of LAN, which has the lowest income per 
unit of the airlines considered, and in the relatively high prof i ts of 
Aerovías Venezolanas and the Honduran airl ine SAHSA.«. The level of returns 
on the operation of the other airlines must, therefore, be put down to 
the amount of running costs; this i s obvious in the case of the Venezuelan 
airlines, which have a high income per unit transported but also have 
high running costs (see tables 18, 19 and 20), 
/Table 19 
Table 












Results Operating result on relation t o : Operating 
expenditure 
Operating 















(Thousands of dollars) (Percentages (Dollar cents per ton/km) 
Aerolíneas Argentinas S ... 63 554 70 066 72 171 -2 105 -6 877 ... -3-3 -2.9 31.6 35.8 -1.0 
Cruzeiro do Sul (Brazil) Pr 39 220 23 372 22 777 23 235 -458 224 -1.2 -2.0 -2.0 39.9 39.7 -o.8; 
VARIG (Brazil) Pr 97 157 80 129 86 SOI 83 934 2 567 2 I34 2.6 3-2 3.1 28.3 29.4 0.9 
LAN (Chile) S 4o 247 15 866 18 251 24 905 -6 654 -2 608 -16.5 -41.9 -26.7 23.0 33-9 -9.1 
AVIANCA (Colombia) Pr 58 596 53 854 56 844 54 654 2 I90 2 658 3.7 4.1 4.0 32.2 32.4 1.3 
LACSA (Costa Rica) Pr 5 109 5 373 5 638 5 449 I89 I58 3.7 3.5 3.5 33.8 32.6 1.2 
Ecuatoriana de Aviación Pr 3 241 6 ¿85 7 64o 7 113 528 65 16.3 7.9 7.4 31.6 33.6 2.5 
SAHSA (Honduras) Pr 1 374 3 211 3 611 3 329 282 254 20.5 8.8 8.5 54.6 49.2 4.2 
Aerolíneas Peruanas (APSA) Pr 25 808 15 862 16 3 77 18 606 -2 229 -1 203 -8.6 -14.1 -12.0 31.4 36.8 -4.4 
Aeronaves de Mexioo S ... 45 946 46 921 45 520 3 401 3 037 ... 7.4 7.5 38.2 37.9 2.8 
VIASA (Venezuela) . S 14 015 33 106 38 686 37 822 864 1 971 6.2 2.6 2.3 44.9 51.3 1.2 
Aerovías Venezolanas Pr 11 105 11 770 18 138 17 202 936 2 28O 8.4 8.0 5.4 65.9 96.3 5.3 
Línea Aeropoatal Venezolana s 11 556 10 393 12 376 12 083 293 293 2.5 2.8 2.4 72.2 83.9 2.1 
Souroe: International Civil Aviation Organization (XCAO), Digest of Statist ics No 145; Fjnanolal Data. 1968. 
a / Ss State-owned; Pr: Private. 
Table 20 
LATIN AMERICA; PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OP OPERATING EXPENDITURE POR SELECTED AIRLINES, I968 
TJ W 
$1 " o 
CD S 
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-o K> Plight eperations 


















Sales ^ f 1 Other 
and adminis- operating 
promotion trative expenses 
expenses 
TJ <D <+ 
£ <D 
Cruzeiro do Sul (Brazil) 7.6 34.9 12.8 5.1 14.2 8.5- 19.8 4.6 0.1 
VARIG (Brazil) 9.2 24.8 12.2 8.3 6.7 9.1 26.4 4.7 7-8 
UN (Chile) l l . o 31.5 17.9 9.9 10.5 8.1 9.5 12.2 0.4 
AVIANCA (Colombia) 7.3 21.2 12.0 11.1 17.1 6.5 21.1 11.0 -
Sooiedad de Aeronavegación de 
Ifedellfn (Colombia; 10.6 30.8 28.2 3.7 11.8 3.5 17.4 4.6 -
LACSA (Costa Rioa) 12.2 24.8 I7.9 10.0 8.7 6.1 21.6 10.9 -
Eouatorlana de Avlaaián 7.1 28.3 11.7 7.1 12.6 5.8 29.5 4.1 0.9 
SAHSA (Honduras) 8.6 33.6 5.6 12.0 20.8 3.5 y 8.1 16o2 
TAN (Honduras) 4.8 30.7 I5.9 6.5 17.6 5.5 7.8 16.0 -
Aerolíneas Peruanas 5.8 25.3 12.7 11.3 11.9 3-8 27.3 6.9 0.8 
Aerovías Venezolanas 7.7 20.7 25.7 17.8 3.7 2.9 22.4 6.8 -
Línea Aérea Postal Venezolana 8.6 23.0 22.8 8.3 17.7 2.9 13.1 8.5 3.7 
VIASA (Venezuela) 4.9 38.7 10.5 7.0 7.3 7-5 19.6 9.4 -
Simple average 8.1 28.3 15.8 9,1 12.4 5.7 19.6 8.3 0.8 
Source: International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Digest of Statlstlos N° 145; Flnanolal Data, I968, page 50. 
a / Including wages and salaries and expenses of orevs. 
b / Included in "Other operating expenses". 
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4. Petroleum enterprises 
(a) Relative importance of public and private enterprises 
Public enterprises handle most of the o i l production and refining 
activities: in the Latin American oi l countries ~ with the single exception 
of Venezuela, which is the region's major exporter (see table 21)# Their 
legal form differs from country to country, they have been in operation 
for different periods, and their degree of importance also varies* In 
general, however, they are profit-making, finance a large proportion of 
their capital expenditure, and account for a significant percentage of 
total investment in each country» The manpower they employ depends on 
their scale of operation, fluctuating around 34*000 persons in Argentina 
and Brazil and 4*000 in Bolivia,. Chile and Colombia (see table 22)« 
In Argentina, the crude petroleum produced by the State Petroleuim 
Corporation (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales - YPF) in the past decade 
amounted to about 70 per cent of the country's total output* In addition 
to YPF, several foreign companies and other domestic enterprises have a 
share in production through contracts with the State enterprise* I f their 
output were added to YPFfs, the proportion would come close to 100 per cent» 
In any case, the present contract system is different from the former system 
of concessions, whose importance declined from 5#5 per cent in i960 to 
1.1 per cent in 1969* YPF produced 14.9 million cubic metres of crude in 
1969, the main contractors being Pan American and Argentina Cities Service, 
which contributed 11,3 and 11*1 per cent respectively. The most important 
concessionaire, Shell CAPS A, produced 124,000 cubic metres the same year* 
Notwithstanding the high level of self-sufficiency attained, however, 
imports of crude petroleum, petroleum products, lubricants and liquid 
gas totalled over 98 million dollars in 1969» Table 23 shows YPF « a share 





UTIN AMERICA« SHAi® OF STATS ENTERPRISES IN THE PRODUCTION OF CRUDE PETROI£UM 
AND REFINING CAPACITY, BY COUNTRY* I969 
(Percentages) 
Country Enterprise Production Refining 
Argentina Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (Y.P.F.) 71.9 y 
Bolivia Yacimientos Petrolíferos Flsoales Bolivianos (Y*P*F#B.) 28.0 y 100*0 
Brazil Petróleo Bmsllelro (PETROBRAS) 100.0 98*3 
Colombia Empresa Colombiana de Petróleo (ECOPETROL) 18*5 55.3 
Cuba Empresa Petrolera Cubana (E*P.C.) ioo.o 100*0 
Chile Represa Nacional de Petróleo (BNAP) 100*0 100*0 
Mexico Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 100*0 100*0 
Peru Petróleos del Perd (PETROPERD) 2U*8 A.5 
Uruguay Administración Nacional de Combustibles, Alcohol 
y Portland (ANCAP) - 100*0 
Venezuela Corporación Venezolana del Petróleo (C#V.P*) 0 . 9 l A 
Sourcet ECLA, on the basis of official statistics* 
a / Output of YPF proper* If the production of enterprises under oontract with YPF is added, the 
proportion rises to 98*9 per cent* 
























Source: Reports of the various enterprises, and EC LA, on the basis of 
o f f i c ia l statistics. 
Table 23 
ARGENTINA: SHARE OF YIF IN THE DOMESTIC MARKET 
FOR PETROLEUM FRODUCTS, 1969 
Product Percentage share Product 
Percentage 
share 
Aviation gasoline 60.2 Fuel for jet 
aircraft 42.0 . 
Ordinary gasoline 55.7 Gas o i l 56.6 
Special gasoline 53.8 Diesel o i l 71.6 
Kerosene 54.0 Fuel o i l 61.1 




In Bolivia, the share of the State Petroleum Corporation (Yacimientos 
Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos - YPFB) in the petroleum sector dwindled 
steadily over the past decade up to the time when the Bolivian Gulf 031 
Company was expropriated, in October 1969» Until 1955> YPFB was the only 
enterprise operating in this sector, as all former concessions had been 
cancelled; but from 1955 onwards other enterprises were established, 
including the Bolivian Gulf Oil Company. In 1963 YPFB produced twenty-seven 
times more crude petroleum than Gulf Oil, but in 1968 and 1969, while the 
latter produced 1,886,000 and 1,385,000 cubic metres respectively, YPFB»s 
output was only 497,000 and 661,000. Moreover, in 1969, each enterprise 
owned half of all the assets of Bolivia's petroleum industry, although 
Gulf Oil had no refinery. Further, the State enterprise had rights over 
27 per cent of the known crude and condensed petroleum reserves compared 
with Gulf 011*3 73 per cent, and i ts share of the total gas reserves, was 
only 10 per cent» The export position of the State enterprise also 
deteriorated, since the extraordinary increase from 300,000 cubic metres 
í ( 
in 1963 to 1*7 million cubic metres in 1968 is mainly attributable to Gulf 
Oil (see table 24). The situation changed completely in October 1969 with 
the nationalization of Gulf Oil; all i ts assets were transferred to YPFB, 
which thus became Bolivia's sole producer» 
Table 24 
BOLIVIA: PETROLEUM EXPORTS 
(Thousands of cubicmerges) 
Year YPFB Gulf BQC Total 
1963 107.9 — 20.5 128.4 
1966 50.0 245.2 4.3 299.5 
1968 402.0 1 3OO.O — '1,702.0 
1969 512.2 1 085.3 mm 1 597.5 
Source:•Dirección General de Petróleo, cited in Ministerio de Planificación 
y Coordinación, Estrategia socio-económica del desarrollo nacional* 




In Brazil, the State enterprise (PEZTROBRAS) has a monopoly of petroleum 
production and refining, although i t respects the refining concessions 
granted before 1953» The main characteristics of the sector today are i t s 
heavy petroleum imports and it3 virtual self-sufficiency in refined products. 
For instance, domestic production of petroleum products supplied 91 per cent 
of domestic demand in 1968, and 98 per cent in 1969J but in regard to 
production, in the last few year® the continued increase in the proportion 
of domestic petroleum refined locally has come to a halt* In 1967, 
approximately 52 per cent of the crude o i l refined in Brazil came from 
" EETROBRAS, but the proportion dropped to 45 and 42 per cent in 1967 and 
1968, respectively. This was because FETROBRAS's production rose by 
17 per cent (to a volume of 10.2 million cubic metres) during that period, 
while total petroleum consumption increased;: by 32 per cent (in terms of 
value) and the volume absorbed by local refineries by 49 per cent. There» 
were thus two parallel dev&lopments: an increase in consumption and an 
increase in the share of Brazilian refineries in the total supply of 
petroleum products. In recent years, PETROBRAS has stepped up Its direct-
share in the distribution of petx'oleum product®, which rose from 14«3 per cent 
of total supply in 1968 to 17 per cent in 1969 through the operation of 
376 distribution serviceffi.^ 
In Chile, the State enterprise (ENAP) has a complete monopoly of 
production and refining. In 1968 i t produced 55 per cent of the 4.3 million 
cubic metres of crude refined in the country, and i t has become virtually 
self-sufficient in petroleum refining (see table 25). In contrast with the 
policy of other similar enterprises, however, ENAP takes no direct part in 
the distribution of petroleum products, which i s in the hands of national 
and foreign private companies. Figure I shows how the price of petroleum 
products is distributed among the State enterprise, the Treasury and the 
distributors. 
In Mexico, PEMEX has a monopoly of petroleum production, refining and 
distribution. Some 25» 5 million cubic metres of crude petroleum were 
produced in 1968 for the local refineries. 





CHILE: SHARE OF ENAP'S PRODUCTION IN TOTAL CONSUMPTION OF 
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, 1968 
Product Percentages 
Liquid gas 
Diesel o i l 








Source: ENAP, Memoria 1968. 
(b) FinancjLa?. results of operation 
Table 26 presents some of the financial results of the operation of 
State petroleum enterprises, which show a high operating surplus in 
relation to sales and, in some cases, capital. The data were taken from 
the balance sheets of the enterprises, but the balance sheets are presented 
in different ways, which somewhat limits their comparability. In any case, 
some significant indicators may be drawn from them for evaluating performance • 
These enterprises account for a high proportion of gross fixed capital 
investment in their respective countries, ranging from 8.2 down to 
3»8 per cent in Mexico, Argentina and Brazil. They also have a large 
share in total public investment: as much as 22 per cent in Mexico and 
15 per cent in Brazil (see table 27). 
As a general rule, these enterprises are so profitable that they 
can finance all or nearly all of their gross capital fixed investment 
with their own resources. Table 28 shows the percentage of gross fixed 





CHILE Î PRICE COMPONENTS OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, 1968 






SIATE PETROIEDM ENTERPRISES: SOMS ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL 









YFF (Argentina) 30.7 « • • 
i 
• •• 
YFFB (Bolivia) • • • 40.4 
PETROBRAS (Brazil) • • • 34.9 51*8 
MAP (Chile) 40.9 31.6 a/ 20*5 a/ 
ECOFETROL (Colombia) 19.0 • • • « • • 
EEMEX (Mexico) 14.8 b/ 
CVP (Venezuela) • • # 2o.o y V7.3 y 
Source: Annual reports of the enterprises, and ECIA, on the basis of 
o f f i c i a l statistics. 
a/ Net profit for financial year 1 July 1967-30 June 1968. Income 
from sales during this period was 662.2 million escudos. 




T alile 27 
SHARE OF STATE PETROLEUM ENTERPRISES IK TOTAL GROSS FIXED 
INVESTMENT OF THE COUNTRY AND OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR, 
AROUND 1968/1969 
(Percentages) 
Share in total Share in fixed 
gross fixed investment of 






Source: Annual x-eports of the enterprises, and ECLA, on the basis of 
o f f i c ia l statistics, 
a/ General government investment only. 
Table 28 
STATE PETROLEUM ENTERPRISES: FINANCING OF INVESTMENT Ai© 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE, AROUND 1968/1969 
(Percentage ratios) 
4.4 









Own resources a/ Own resources a/ 
Gross fixed Capital 
investment expenditure 
YPF (Argentina) 96.5 81.4 
PBTROBRAS (Brazil) 117.6 68.5 
ENAP (Chile) 175.6 91.9 
ECOPETRQL (Colombia) 77.7 ' 61.9 
PEMEX (Mexico 54.8 
Source: Annual reports of the enterprises, and ECLA, on the basis of 
o f f i c ia l -statistics. 
a/ Including operating surplus and other capital returns. 
/ 5 . Electric 
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$» Electric power enterprises 
(a) Importance in sector 
Since electric energy must be generated and distributed to satisfy 
the community's needs, the State not only controls production and regulates 
electricity rates but in many cases owns the electric power enterprises. 
In most Latin American countries, moreover, there i s an evident trend 
towards nationalizing the sector, since ef forts to expand installed 
capacity have been channelled primarily through State enterprises. In 
Argentina, for example, while public uti l ity generation increased by 
about 70 per cent from I960 to 1968, State-owned enterprises doubled 
their output; in Chile the increases were 60 and 86 per cent, respectively; 
in Mexico, with the nationalization of electric power, the State 
enterprise was responsible for the whole increment; in Brazil, the 
/ 
subsidiary enterprises of ELETROBRAS and public and sémi-public enterprises 
(with a minority share of the capital in the hands, cf EIKIRCBRAS) are at 
present meeting over 60 per cent of public demand» 
The existence of both public and private electric power enterprises - a 
system which is not usually encountered in other sectors - is significant in 
electric power, since, far from competing, they often complement ®ne 
another's production through interconnected distribution systems, arid 
nót infrequently a private company will sell the energy generated by the 
public enterprise, or vice versa» In some cases, moreover, the installation 
of a now plant is jointly planned with the object of ensuring complementary 
investment» Thus large private companies continue to operate, many of 
them maintaining a regular programme for expanding their generating 
capacity. 
Mexico's Comisién Federal de Electricidad i s an example of a 
large-scale State enterprise which is solely responsible for electricity 
supply. It was established in 1937 as a decentralized public agency with 
i ts own net worth. Since i960, with the nationalization of the electric 
power industry, i t has generated practically all the electric energy for 
public consumption and is at present the largest enterprise of its kind 
/ i n the 
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in the region. In Paraguay, Uruguay, the Dominican Republic and, to all 
intents and purposes, El Salvador, State-owned electric power enterprises 
are also the sole electricity enterprises, satisfying the entire public 
demand. 
In Chile, ENDESA, which was established in 1943 as a limited company 
with 97 per cent of the shares in the hands of the Production Development 
Corporation (CORFO), produces two-thirds of the energy for public 
consumption; nearly all the remainder is generated by a private company 
which became a semi-public enterprise at the end of 1970 when the State 
purchased 51 per cent of the shares. 
There are two or more public or semi-public enterprises in Argentina, 
Brazil and Venezuela, In Argentina, for example, the State-owned Agua y 
Energfa Electrica and SBGBA S.A. generate approximately three-quarters 
of the energy for public consumption. Two State-owned limited companies, 
CADAEE and EDEL CA, are operating in Venezuela; they were established with 
capital provided by the Venezuelan Development Corporation and the 
Venezuelan Guayana Corporation, respectively. Between them they supply 
about 60 per cent of the total public consumption of energy» 
The position of public enterprises producing electric energy in 
Brazil became more complex when ELETROBRAS started operating in 1962, 
This new semi-public company in which the Federal Government has a majority 
share, controls? sixteen subsidiary electric power enterprises, , owning 
about 90 per cent of their capital. It also has a minority share (an 
average of 12 per cent) in nineteen others, mostly local state and 
semi-public enterprises. In 1968, the subsidiaries of ELETROBRAS produced 
36 per cent of the total energy for public consumption and the associated 
public enterprises produced 27 per cent, 
(b) Financial results of operation 
Owing to the rapid growth of demand for electric energy in all the 
Latin Mexican countries, the public electric power enterprises have had 
to expand steadily. This has entailed heavy investment, which is nearly 
always too large to allow of self-financing» The funds are generally 
obtained from three sources? State contributions, external credit and 
reinvestment of profits. Domestic credit is l i t t l e used owing to the 




Argentina's Agua y Energia El^ctrica was able to finance about half 
of i t s investment with its own resources in 1968, 8 per cent consisted of 
funds obtained from a Federal development agency, and the rest of internal 
and external credit* On the other hand, a large part of the investment of 
two semi-public enterprises in Brazil (70 and 30 per cent, respectively) 
was financed by the paying up of shares that had been subscribed by the 
state and Federal Governments; self-financing accounted for 10 per cent 
of investment in the f irst enterprise and 28 per cent in the second® 
External credit played an important part (15 per cent) only in the f i rst 
enterprise, and Federal funds in the second (36 per cent)» ENDESA (Chile) 
financed 35 per cent of i ts investment and new plant with external credit, 
35 per cent from reinvestment of profits, and the remaining 30 per cent 
from State contributions. 
Whether or not an enterprise can cover i t s own investment expenditure 
will obviously depend on i t s profitability, «ne indicator of which is the . 
ratio of net operational income to fixed assets. In using this indicator, 
i t must be borne in mind that the validity of the comparisons is limited 
by the differences in presentation and even in the criteria for classifying 
the items in the balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of the various 
enterprises. Despite these reservations, however, some conclusions may be 
reached. It will be noted, for example, that #f the twenty enterprises 
considered - which produce 66 per cent of the total energy for public 
consumption - a return of over 10 per cent was recorded in six enterprises, 
5 to 10 per cent in nine, and less than 5 per cent in five (see table 29). 
In Brazil, this ratio was 7* 5 per cent in fourteen subsidiaries: of 
ELETROBRAS, and 8.9 per cent in fourteen other enterprises in which 
i t has a minority share. 
/Table 29 
Table 2$ 
LATIN AMERICA: LARGEST PUBLIC EIECTRIC POWER SUPPLY ENTERPRISES, I968 0 / 
Produotion Sales 
Operating income and expenditure Results as a Gross p r o f i t Average prioe of 




of f ixed 
per kWh 
sold 
(®Jh) (Millions of currency units of eaoh country) assets (Thousendths of a do l lar ) 
Argentina 
Agua y Energía El íotr loa (A y E) 
Servicios Eléotrioos del Gran Buenos Aires (SEGBá) 


































Central Eletrioa de Sao Paulo 
Corapanhia Hldroeletrloa de Sfio Franoisco 
Central Eletrloa de Minas Gerals (CEMIG) 












































Empresa de Energía Eléctrica de Bogotá (EEE) S 
6 522 
1 669 l 453 261.3 270.5 125.8 144.7 10.0 8.03 10,61 
Chile 
Empresa Naclanal de Eleotrloidad (ENDESA) d / 























Instituto Costarricense de Eleotrloidad S 
221 
4 9 7 486 64.3 64.5 50.O 14.5 3.7 11.28 . 18,00 
El Salvador 
Comisión Ejecutiva Hidroeléctrica del 
Río Lempa (CEL) S 
542 
501 466 18.2 18.7 9 .4 9.3 8.5 10.00 15.64 
México 
Comisión Federal de Eleotrloidad f / S 
19 4oo 
17 200 13 908 2 877.3 2 889.6 1 956.1 933-7 6.2 7 . 3 7 16.56 
Paraguay 
Administración Nacional de Electricidad (ANDE) s 
122 
H9 90 679.5 689.4 477.6 211.8 3.6 23.7 60.00 
Parama 
Compañía Panameña de Puarza, y Luz Pr 
551 
456 387 13.2 13.2 8.6 4,6 1 5 . 3 G / 17a 34.09 
PERÚ 
Empresas Eléotrioos Asociadas (EEA) Pr 
2 286 
1 155 1 565 1 32O.O 1 3 4 0 . 8 925.3 415.5 9 .1 9.09 1 9 . 0 9 
*d M P \ OQ O 
CD S 
00 M M M 
Table 29 ( c onc i . ) 













of f ixed 
assets 
t (GKh) (Millions of ourreney units of each oountry) (Thousandths of a do l lar ) 
Dominican Republio J 700 
-
Corporaoién Domlnloana de Elaotricidad S 700 529 18.2 18.3 13.4 4.9 8.1 13.U 34.38 
Uruguay ! M«? 
Usinas El¿et r i cas del Estado) S 1 883 1 513 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ... • • • 
1 
Venezuela - , L225. 
C.A. de Administraclfin y Foménto 
El lotr ioo (CADAK) h / } S 2 189 1 842 237.1 237.8 225.I 12.7 1.8 7-55 28.60 
Eleotri f ioaeldn del Careni (ÈDELCA) S 2 690 2 554 35.2 35.2 14.3 20.9 10.4 I.82 3.07 
C.A. La. Eleotrioidad do Caracas Pr 2 273 1 974 206.4 207.2 124.5 82.7 16.2 9.3I 23.24 
Total Latin America ! 100 675 
•tj M P3 OH O 
CD 3 













ce sheets of the enterprises. 
State enterprises ( s ) Include state and municipal enterprises, and semi-publio enterprises in which private investors hold a minority share o f the capital» Sales inoluda energy 
purchased from other enterprises and are considered at the user l eve l , i . e . , the enterprise 's own consumption and losses in transmission were deduoted. Operating expenditure includes, 
in addition to direct oosts and administrative expenses, the amounts set aside f o r depreciation, amortization and taxes, except f o r taxes on pro f i t s and dividends. Gross p r o f i t was 
considered to be only the di f ferenos between operating income and d i rec t oosts and administrative overheads. Por the comparison of the results o f operation, construction work in 
progress was not considered as f ixed assets, but revaluation and depreciation were Included. To arrive at the f igures in thousandths of a do l lar in the l as t two columns, the 
following exohange rates (national currency to the do l lar ) were used-. Argentina 350, Brazil 3.83, Colombia 16.95, Chile 8.71 f o r I968 and 11.52 f o r I969, Costa Rica 7*35» 
El Salvador 2.50, Mexico 12.49, Paraguay 126, Panaaa and Dominican Republio at par. Pern U4.19, and Venezuela 4.50 f o r 1967 and 1968. The resulting f igures are not always comparable 
between countries as the r^tes used are not parity exchange rates« 
The value of the f ixed asssts includes that of drinking water supply plant, which i t was not possible to deduct. 
Figure f or the sixteen subsidiary enterprises, inoluding the Ccsapanhia Hidroelétrica de S&o Francisoo, which i s a lso given separately. 
The production and sales filkures in the f i r s t two columns are f o r I9685 the rest are f o r I969. 
Revaluation, which was penciling approval, was not taken Into account in the f igure f o r f ixed assets . 
The production figure i s f or the period September O/"ÁüqUSw I968 only; the ether f igures are f o r 1967« 
Only the proportion relating to e l e c t r i c energy generation was considered in the f igure f o r f ixed assets, the depreciation figure which was deduoted being calculated proport ional ly . 
Pinanoial year I967. f 
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In order to assess the profitability of enterprises from a different 
' 18/ standpoint, an attempt was made to measure the gross operating profit,™-
in terms of dollars per KWh sold. This indicator is more directly related 
to the rate level? but comparability may be impaired on account of the 
exchange rate used for the dollar, since in general this was the free 
market rate or the highest o f f i c ia l rate, which i s sometimes quite different 
from a parity exchange rate based on real purchasing power. Bearing in 
mind these reservations, i t can be seen that the profits of some enterprises 
in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela are, quite small 
compared with those of enterprises in Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Panama and Paraguay, which are very much larger (see table 29)o 
Moreover, i t ia enlightening to compare the sale prices of the 
energy supplied by several large enterprises*^/ It will be noted that 
the average sale price of 1 kWh ranges from just over 10 thousandths of 
OQ/ 
a dollar ~ in one Bogota enterprise and three enterpriser in Brazil to 
34 thousandths in Argentina and Panama; i t is 17 to 19 thousandths of a 
dollar in Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru, and 22 and 29 in the case of two 
Venezuelan enterprises. In Chile, the average price of 28 thousandths of 
a dollar in the most important private company (which i s closer to the 
consumer price level) is twice that of the State-owned enterprise, because 
the latter makes block assignments of i ts production to private distributors 
and large-scale basicr industries. 
18/ The difference between operating receipts and direct cost plus 
administrative expenditure, 
19/ Comparisons of average prices between countries, or even between 
enterprises in the same country, should be made with caution because 
of possible distortions on account of the exchange rates used, and 
because of the varying composition of the supply to sectors with 
differential rates, 
20/ In general, at 1968 free market exchange rates. 
/ in order 
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In order to compare 1968 prices with those prevailing in 1959* for 
táiich year data are available, the average 1968 prices were deflated by 
the consumer price index (see table 30)m An attempt was made to use 
information for the same enterprises for the two years, which limited the 
number of observations. It will be seen that prices f e l l in five of the 
nine countries considered. In Argentina, there was a drop of just over 
10 per cent in both a public and a private enterprise. The reductions 
in the real price of 1 kWh sold by the.largest private company in Peru 
and by the Comisión Federal de Electricidad in Mexico were 22 and 17 per cent, 
respectively. In the case of the latter enterprise, a radical change took 
place in the composition of consumption,, parallel with i ts expansion since 
I960 when Mexico nationalized its electric power industry, Venezuela also 
registered a drop in unit prices, which was minimal for the State enterprise, 
CADAFE, but as much as 17 per cent in the case of one important private 
company. In Panama, the price of 1 kWh sold by the Compañía Panameña de 
Fuerza y Luz dropped 30 per cent between 1959 and 1968. Of the three 
countries where inflation was most acute, i t is curious to note that the 
real average sales price rose in Brazil and Chile, and fe l l by about 
10 per cent in Argentina. 
There were also changes in consumption by type of user of the energy 
produced. For example, one Brazilian State enterprise showed a rise of 
12 per cent in the over-all price, which reflected the same average price 
for industrial consumption, minor increases in the commercial sector and 
larger increases in the prices "of household supply. In contrast, the -
Empresa de Energía Eléctrica de Bogotá spread the increase in its average 
price (19 per cent) over both industrial consumption (86 per cent) and 
commercial consumption (54 per cent), while the price of 1 kWh of 
household supply remained practicallyUnchanged from 1959 to 1968. 
6. Steel enterprises / 
(a) Importance in the sector 
In 1966, out of a total of seventeen major integrated enterprises 
producing 80 per cent of the region's steel, eight were State enterprises 
proper and accounted for 47 per cent of production (see table 31); two others, 
with mixed private and public capital, accounted for 12 per cent; two 
controlled by foreign capital accounted for 7 per cent; and the remaining 





LATIN*AMERICA: AVERAGE SALES PRICES OF ELECTRIC ENERGY 
(Average price-of 1 hMh in 1959 national currencies)^ 
1959 1968 
Argentina 
Servicios Eléctricos del Gran Buenos Aires 1.92 1.72 
Compañía Italo Argentina de Electricidad 2.21 1.92 
Brazil 
Central Elétrica de Ulnas Gerais 0.989 1.098 
Colombia 
Empresa de Energía Eléctrica de Bogotá 0.0517 0.0703 
Chile 
Empresa Nacional de Electricidad 0.016 0.0176 
Compañía Chilena de Electricidad 0.0245 0.0359 
Costa Rica 
Instituto Costarricense de Energía Eléctrica 0.097 0.H0 
Mexico ' 
Comisión Federal de Electricidad 0.202 0.167 
Panama ¡ 
Compañía Panameña de Fuerza y Luz 0.045 0.031 
Peru 
Empresas Eléctricas Asociadas 0.45 0,35 
Venezuela 
b f! 
C.A. de Administración y Fomento Eléctrico 0.122 0.120 •J' 
C.A. Eléctrica de Caracas 0.116 0.097 
Source; Annual reports and balance sheets of enterprises, 
a/ The 1968 price8 were deflated by the consumer price index» 





LATIN AMERICA: OUTPUT OP THE UfOEST STEEL ENTERPRISES ^ 
(Thousands of tons) 
Steel Steel 
ingots produote 
Argentina 1 6?7 
Sooiedad Mixta Siderurgia Argentina (SGMSA) I s 846 529 
Altos Hornos de Zapla I s 82 38 
Dalmine Sidérea S.A. SI Pr 163 9k 
Industria Argentina de Aceros (ACINDAR) SI Pr 89 230 
Establecimientos Metalúrgicos Santa Rosa SI Pr 110 112 
La Cantábrica SI Pr 57 56 
Brazll 4 302 
Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional I S 1 33*+ 1 007 
Usinas Siderúrgicas de Hiñas Gerais I S 649 502 
Companhia Slderúrgloa P&ollsta (COSIPA) I S 558 1+13 
Companhia Siderúrgica Belgo«Mlnelra I Pr 538 430 
Companhia Siderúrgica Mannesmann I P* 260 219 
Slderúrgloa Rio Grandense SI Pr 146 123 
Companhia A908 Itablra Aoesita I S 131 77 
Slderúrgloa Barra Mansa I Pr 113 96 
Siderúrgica J.L. Allpertl S.A. I Pr 102 m 
M. Dedini S.A. Metalúrgica SI Pr 83 78 
Companhia Ferro e Ajo de Vitoria SI S - 69 
Usina Slderúrgloa Sao José S.A. SI Pr 09 51 
A908 Anhanguera SI Pr 72 47 
Colombia 252. 
Acerías Paz del Río S.A» I Pr 196 1&4 
Chile S £ 
Compañía de Aoero del fecífico (CAP) I S 592 1+50 
Ifexleo 3 421 
Altos Hornos de Máxioo S.A* I S 1 925 
Compañía Fundidora de Monterrey S.A. I Pr 621 395 
Hojalata y Lámina S.A. I Pr 453 388 
Tubos de Aoero de M&cloo (TAMSA) SI Pr 244 163 y 
Aoero8 Ecatepec SI Pr 78 93 
Perú 192 
Sooiedad Slderúrgloa de Chimbóte (SOQESA) I S 61 51 
Venezuela 84o 
Slderúrgloa del Orlnooo C.A. (SIDOR) I S ... 
latin America 11 969 
Souroe: Instituto Latinoamerlcano del Fierro y del Aoero, Re vista Latinoamerlcana de S^derflrglca, N° 125» 
September 1970; Repertorio de las Empresas Latlnoamerloanas, I969 ; Naolonal Flnanoiera S.A..2 
Info me de Aotlvldadea 1969» (frfexlooh Compaftia de Aoero del Pacific© S.A.i Memorla Anual 1968/69? 
Centro de Industrla Siderdrgiea: La Slderurgla Argentina en 1968» 
The regional and country totals are for 1969« The output of eaoh enterprise is normally that for 1967* 
except for the Brazilian enterprises^ SOHISA in Argentina and AHMSA and TAMSA in Mexico, which is the 
output for 1968, The figures for CAP in Chile correspond to the financial year 1968-1969, The entries 
against eaoh enterprise indicate the following] I - integrated enterprise; SI - semi-Integra ted 
enterprise; S - State enterprise; and Pr - private enterprise* 




Steel enterprises have to increase their capital continually to 
finance the large amount of investment required to keep pace with the 
rapid growth of demand. For example the Chilean Compañía de Acero del 
Pacífico (CAP), which began operations in 1950 with a capital of 15 million 
dollars, by 1969 had a subscribed and paid-up capital of 79 mi Ilion dollars. 
The capital and reserves of Altos Hornos de Mexico S,A. (AHMSA) increased 
at current prices from 313 million pesos in 1958 to 1,166 million in 1967» 
These increase© in capital may reflect changes in ownership as, for example, 
in the Colombian enterprise Acería Paz del Rio, with an annual output of 
200,000 tons, which has passed almost entirely into private hands as a 
result of a f iscal measure granting tax exemptions to persons purchasing 
shares in the enterprise at face value in an amount equal to their tax 
l iab i l i t ies . The opposite has happened with CAP in Chile - whose annual 
output of steel amounts to 592,000 tons - in which the Government's share 
was gradually reduced as a result of increases in capital until, in 1965 i t 
amounted to only 25 per cent of the total. In 1969, however, the Chilean 
Development Corporation purchased shares from private shareholders until 
i t had secured 52 per cent of the total share capital, v 
According to a survey made in I964 by the Latin American Iron and. 
2 1 / 
Steel Institute,4— covering twenty-two integrated and semi-integrated 
enterprises in the region, investment financing came from the following; 
sources;: 43«7 Per cent from the public séftor; 5»7 per cent from the 
domestic private sector; 2.5 per cent from the external private sectorj 
about 19.5 per cent from domestic credit and roughly the same proportion 
from external credit, while reinvested profits- accounted for only 
4.6 per cent. 
The situation of State steel companies varies a great deal from 
country to country. In Argentina, the State enterprise Sociedad Mixta 
Siderúrgica Argentina (SOMISA) accounts for about 55 per cent of domestic 
steel production, with a sales volume of 70,000 million pesos. The other 
21/ 2LAFA, Condiciones económicas que reculan el crecimiento de la 
producción latinoamericana de acero, a document presented to the 
Second United Nation® Inter-regional Symposium on the Iron and 
Steel Industry, held at Moscow, Septembers-October 1968, 
/integrated enterprise 
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integrated enterprise in Argentina is Altos Hornos de ZAPLA, a public 
enterprise managed by the Dirección General de Fabricaciones Militares 
which accounts for slightly over 6 per cent of domestic output. The 
remainder is produced by semi-integrated enterprises, notably Dalmine 
Siderca, Industria Argentina de Aceros (ACINDAR), Establecimientos 
Metalúrgicos Santa Rosa and La Cantábrica, which account for over 30 per cent 
of total ingot production, Dalmine Siderca produces about 100,000 tons of 
seamless pipe and ACINDAR about 230,000 tons of rolled products. 
In Brazil, four large State enterprises account for 60 per cent of 
steel output in ingots and 57 per cent of the output of rolled products. 
In 1968, the Compañía Siderdrgiea Nacional produced 1.3 million tons of 
ingota at its Volta Redonda plant, and over 1 million tons of rolled 
products. In terms of volume of production, i t is followed by Usinas 
Siderúrgicas de Minas Gerais - USIMINAS (650,000 tons), Siderúrgica Paulista 
(COSIPA) with 560,000 tons, and ACESITA. Some 21 per cent of the capital 
of USIMINAS is Japanese-owned. The main private enterprises are Compañía 
Siderúrgica Belgo-Mineira (540,000 tons) and Compañía Siderdrgiea Mannesmann 
(260,000 tons"), both with some share capital of foreign origin. 
Another large steel company in the region is the State enterprise 
Altos Hornos de México S.A» which produced 1,374*000 tons of ingots at i ts 
Monclova plant in 1968, accounting for 40 per cent of national production. 
There are also two other integrated steel enterprises in Mexico, controlled 
by private capital, which receive financial support from the Government 
through Nacional Financiera S.A. and the Banco de México and produce, 
approximately 35 per cent of national output, namely Compañía Fundidora 
de Monterrey and Hojalata y Lámina S.A. Notable among the semi-integrated 
enterprises in Mexico i s Tubos de Acero de México S.A. (TAMSA) which 
produced 111,000 tons of sponge iron and 244,000 tons of steel in 1968. 
Among the other integrated enterprises in the region are Siderdrgiea 
del Orinoco C.A. (S3D0R) in Venezuela, which i s a State enterprise and a 
subsidiary of the Venezuelan Guayana Development Corporation whose output 
accounts for roughly 80 per cent of total national steel, output; and 
Sociedad Siderdrgiea de Chimbóte (S0GESA) in Peru - also a State enterprise -
which has a smaller output. 
/ ( b ) Financial 
E/CN.12/872 
Page 89 
(b) Financial restilts of pperations 
The financial results shown on the balance sheets of the steel 
enterprises are relatively favourable, although the surpluses are not 
generally large enough to finance expansion programmes. 
A look at the financial situation of the largest state steel enterprises 
in the region can provide some indication of their profitability and the 
structure of tjheir expenditure (see table 32). All the enterprises 
considered showed a surplus in the period studied, ranging from 5.1 per cent 
of the value of sales in the case of AHMSA (Mexico) to 19.5 per cent for 
SOMISA (Argentina)j the comparable figure for the largest Brazilian 
enterprise, Compañía Siderúrgica Nacional, was 5*6 per cent, and for CAP 
(Chile) 9.3 per cent. 
Expressed as a ratio to capital plus reserves, profits by CAP 
amounted to I4.6 per cent and AHMSA 8 per cent. The Brazilian Compañía 
Siderúrgica Nacional had a ratio of 5*4 per cent in 1968 (disregarding 
the deficit stemming from i ts administration of the Usina de Mogi das 
Crucos), but in 1969, according to a survey covering a large number of 
22/ 
enterprises in many branches of Brazilian industry,— i t had raised this 
ratio to 7*8 per cent. The ratio of profits to capital and reserves was 
4.7 per cent for USIMINAS, a semi-public enterprise, and 21.3 per cent 
for the private enterprise Siderúrgica Marine smann. The ratio was negligible 
in the case of COSIPA and only 1,4 per cent in the case of ACESITA, but 
this was due to the fact that both these enterprises are in the process of 
expanding capacity and therefore current production i s not in line with 
the high level of their capital and reserves. 
Both the Compañía Siderúrgica Nacional and AHMSA have experienced 
a decline in their profits/sales ratios. Up to 1965, the former achieved 
high ratio (in I963 i t was 29.4 per cent), while for AHMSA the profits/sales 
ratio f e l l from 6«9 to 5.5 per cent between I960 and 1967, and the ratio 
of profits to capital and reserves from 12 to 7.8 per cent. 






















Profits/Capital and serserves 
Profits/Sales 
As a percentage of sales: 
Administrative costs and expenditure 
Depreciation and amortization 
Taxes 
Interest on long-teiim loans 























Souroe: Annual reports, aooounts and balance-sheets of the enterprises, except in the case of SOMISA, 
for whloh the data was obtained from the Ministry of the Traasury, Dlreeoién Naoional de 




In Chile, CAP's ratio of profits to capital and reserves has been 
very variable, Iii the period 1952-1955 i t averaged 24 per cent, f e l l to 
11 per cent during 1956^1961, and then rose to 22 per cent in 1963-1964, 
since when i t has fluctuated around the 12.8 per cent mark, SOMISA in 
Argentina, on the other hand, did very well in 1969 (a profits/sales 
ratio of 19»5 per cent), and very much better than the average for the 
preceding three years, which was 10 per cent. 
The profit ratios of these enterprises; are not very closely related 
to the price trends of certain steel products ^ in the major domestic 
markets, particularly in the case of SOMISA, In Buenos Aires between 
1965 and 1969, the price of concrete reinforcing bars and zinc-coated 
sheets declined by about 20 per cent in real terms; prices for other rolled 
products and wire rods declined by about 25 per cent and for angles and 
f lats by about 36 per cent. 
Over the same period, prices for all rolled products in Sao Paulo 
f e l l by about 9 per cent, but for all other steel products they rose by 
5 per cent. In Santiago, there was a general price rise for steel products 
of 40 per cent; in Mexico City prices declined in varying degrees, ranging 
from a 17.5 per cent drop for wire bars to 4.4 per cent for rolled products, 
except for concrete reinforcing bars which rose slightly in price. 
The role played by profits in the financing of capital expenditure 
in these enterprises has varied a great deal and has been influenced in 
particular by the scale of investment, which i tse l f i s dependent on the 
achievement of expansion programmes. The profits of SOMISA in 1969 
and CAP in the financial year I968-I969 were well above the level of rea1 
investment in the same years (virtually double for SOMISA and 55' per -cent 
greater for CAP), and yet SOMISA!s over-all surplus was not large enough 
to cover all capital expenditure owing to the high level of expenditure 
under the head of "Other investment". With Compañía Siderúrgica Nacional, 
in Brazil, profits represented 87 per cent of capital formation during 
' 1968, and in Mexico in 1967 AHMSA1 & profits did not amount to as much as 
half real investment (see table 32). 
22/ The data on prices for steel products were obtained from ILAFA, Anuario 
Estadístico 1969. and deflated using appropriate consumer-price indexes. 
/ i t i a 
E/CN •12/872 
Page 92 
It is somewhat more difficult to compare the structure of expenditure 
in these enterprises owing to differences in the presentation of data® 
There i s a striking similarity between CAP and AHMSA as regards the 
structure of expenditure in relation to sales. Expenditure in respect 
of interest and financial costs is relatively high for both; almost the 
same level as profits in the case of CAP and appreciably higher in the 
case of AHMSA* Worthy of note i s the effect of taxes in the Compañía 
Siderúrgica Nacional, which unfortunately could be compared only with AHMSA 




IV. POLICY ON THE PUBLIC ENTERPRISE SECTOR: 
. ALTERNATIVES AND QUERIES 
The Importance and far-reaching influence of public enterprises 
>i 
highlight the need to define a policy on their operations and functions» 
As was said at the beginning of this chapter, that need does not appear 
to have been satisfactorily met up to now. 
This lack or inadequacy could be put down to several factors, one 
being the diversity of the activities concerned, and the other the 
incorporation of enterprises in the sector over a long period of time, 
in response to differing needs and with different degrees of urgency 
which sometimes coincided with the requirements of different stages of 
development. Moreover, the very conception or grouping of State enterprises 
as a "sector" i s a departure from the nornal procedure of lumping them 
together with private firms under the heading of "enterprises". However, 
there has been a clear trend, particularly in Europe, towards considering 
public enterprises separately and as a whole sector. 
In view of Latin America's position with regard to public enterprises 
and the f ie ld covered by this paper, a brief review and discussion are in 
order of the aspects which are most relevant and must be defined in any 
policy or policies that may be formulated for the sector. 
Starting with the points that are directly relevant and about which 
there is; the least argument, the f i rs t question to be considered is what 
role the sector might play in the accumulation of investment capital. 
Mention has already been made of the many different views expressed 
for and against public enterprises. However, recent trends seem to indicate 
that the balance is inclining in their favour. This is made clear in a 
detailed study on recent policy orientation in different representative 
economies,-^ in which i t is stated: 
See "Improving profit performance of public enterprises in developing 
countries" (ST/ECLA/Conf*35/L.8), pages 3 and 4, paper presented by 
the Public Administration Division of the United Nations to the 
Meeting of Experts on Administration of Public Enterprises in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Santiago, 17-22 November 1969). 
/ " » » . in several 
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" . . . in several developing countries observed, the sentiment of 
supervisory authorities is increasingly more favourably disposed 
to the commercial profitability criterion. In India, to begin, 
with, public enterprise was characterized, when development planning 
was instituted, as 'actuated by basic development objectives1. In 
the early days of development planning, there was evidence of o f f i c i a l 
hostility to the notion of commercial profitability. More recently, 
a different doctrine has been enunciated, namely, that public 
enterprises should behave so as to generate surpluses or profits for 
self-financing of their capital expansion. Proponents have pointed 
out that self-financing out of retained earnings has been q major 
source of capital formation in private industry in developed 
countries. Reference has also been made to the fact that State 
enterprises in the Soviet Union and other centrally-planned economies 
are conducted so as to yield a 'profit1 for financing high rates of 
capital formation. The shift away from the practice of 'no profit , 
no loss1 in the British nationalized industries together with the 
renewed emphasis on profit in the recent Soviet reform programme 
have reinforced this trend of o f f i c ia l thinking. The profitability 
criterion, i t seems, has now become the accepted o f f i c ia l doctrine." 
A Brazilian authority, on a study of the problem of the financing of 
the public enterprises that would form the nucleus of economic expansion 
(petroleum, electric energy, steel and iron ore), points to .three principal 
means of action: accumulation of funds through forced saving, a profitable 
commercial policy, and doing away with paternalism in the social services 
that are financed by price subsidies and other means.-^ 
Of course, no simple deductions can be drawn from the prevailing 
trend, and the diverse levels of preparedness of the different public 
enterprises to become profit-makers cannot be l e f t out of account. Some 
would have no dif f iculty in doing so because of their favourable position 
on the market. For others, however, i t would be almost out of the question 
and they could become profit-making only, within certain limits, as in the 
case of railways, whose position has already been discussed. 
25/ See Antonio Dlas Leite, Minister of Mining and Energy in Brazil, 




On the other hand, i t might also be possible to apply a policy of 
profitability to the sector as a whole, or even to groups of similar or 
related enterprises, and not to each individual f ira. This point will 
be taken up again later, when internal relations in the sector are dealt 
with. i 
Lastly, account should be taken of the fact that investment i s not 
a steady flow and of the magnitude of the resources required for expansion* 
•bviously, these investment requirements cannot, as a rule, be met from 
the enterprises1 over-all surplus or even from that of the whole sector 
when i t i s under co-ordinated management. Recourse would have to be had 
to other sources of savings, and for that purpose i t would doubtless be 
an advantage for the individual enterprises or the sector as a whole to 
have fairly large operating surpluses which would help to meet the 
commitments undertaken in the circumstances described above• 
It should not be inferred from the above that the formation of capital 
for investment or, in other words, the profitability of the enterprise, 
depends solely on decisions concerning prices and rates. Other factors 
that have an influence were mentioned earlier, such as the general efficiency 
of operations and wage and salary levels* These are subjects about which 
there has been considerable controversy, and their complexity precludes 
the possibility of any clear-cut approach that could be generally applied» 
At all events, i t seems very clear that the approach to these and other 
relevant questions will depend to a large extent on the adoption or 
rejection of the basic orientation described above, that i s , that the. 
enterprises concerned or the sector as a whole should play an important 
part in the formation and mobilization of savings for priority investment. 
For these reasons, there is no doubt that State ownership of 
enterprises and the trend towards nationalization of the most important 
public uti l i t ies has, in theory, increased the chances of applying a 
policy of the type described above. 
' / I . Position 
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1. Position in the public sector and 
in planning machinery 
Another important question which has not yet been properly clarified, 
and is therefore s t i l l controversial, is the position of public enterprises 
in the machinery of government, i . e . their links with government. 
The main point of discussion is well-known and is summed up by an 
authority already quoted, who points to the need for a uniform legal, 
status that would guarantee the autononjy of public enterprises with respect 
to the government bureaucracy and, at the same time, make effective control 
of the enterprises possible.^^ 
When the subject is analysed the effects and the importance of 
the sector*s heterogeneousness, in respect of both operations and/of 
legal form are obvious, which, in turn, imply different forms of 
management or State control and, as a result, different forms of 
integration in the public sector. 
As is stated in a specialized document, in this variety of situations 
"a continuum can be observed" in which turbulent interrelationships 
predominate, "at one end of which are the enterprises subjected to the 
numerous conflicting pressures exerted by the various components of the 
central guiding nucleus, to many regulatory measures which have a 
paralysing effect and to ambiguous power relationships. At the other 
extreme are the enterprises which maintain univocal power relationships 
with some components of the nucleus, generally the Office of the President, 
relations which are similar to those of a feudal lord with a king".^-^ 
The other aspect to be discussed is the place of public enterprises in the 
planning process and machinery. As is observed in a recent study, the practice 
has been to- treat the economy more or less from a sectoral/technoJogical 
angle, and i t is not often that an institutional conception of public 
26/ A. Díaz Leite, "Empresa pública e desenvolvimiento económico" , op* cit» 
27/ See "Interrelationships between public enterprises and the central 
government; their implications for performance" (ST/ECLA/Conf.35/L.2), 
paper presented by the EC LA Public Administration Unit to the Meeting 





sector participation is observed. Thus, although the plans refer to 
many State activities, for which targets are fixed and funds assigned, 
especially those connected with the creation of capital and the production 
of commonly used inputs, they always do so from the point of view of the 
sector and prtxiuctive activity, and not from the institutional angle that 
defines the scope of the public sector and takes account of the 
28/ 
characteristics that are peculiar to i t , — 
The problem is particularly clear in the light of what was said 
above about the areaa of State control or State dominion» Obviously, i f 
the responsibilities and decisions of the central government and of the 
public enterprises are to be considered separately and as a whole, i t i s 
f i rs t necessary to define the f ield which can best be governed by economic 
policy - a f ield in which, as has been seen, a high proportion of total 
investment is made. 
Moreover, a rough definition of this kind might help to specify 
and distinguish instruments that are suitable for implementing and 
promoting the planning directives in the public jmternrises sector, where 
the government is dominant and in the others (the sphere of private 
enterprise) where its. influence is more indirect, 
2. Internal organization of the public 
enterprises sector 
A third subject that should be considered is the internal organization 
of the public enterprise® sector, which may be said to counterpart or 
complement to their organic incorporation in the public sector. As will 
be shown, these two aspects are closely interrelated, and i t could even 
be said that the solution of the f i rs t problem might be a decisive step 
forward towards the solution of the second. 
2$f See Ricardo Cibotti and Enrique Sierra, El sector público en la 
Planificación del desarrollo. Textos del Instituto Latinoamericano 




Despite attempts to regulate operations in the private enterprise 
sector (or in some parts of i t ) through a central development agency, the 
enterprises are usually widely scattered and without connecting links» 
For the reasons already given, the sector is more like an archipelago 
than a solid mass. 
There seems to be general agreement that the situation has many 
disadvantage® and could be improved by greater internal co-ordination 
or integration. Naturally, this does not only, or necessarily mean 
clumping all the various units together under some higher authority. A 
far more realistic approach would undoubtedly be to adopt one of the various 
methods of integrating more or less similar enterprises, though i t would 
always be useful, in principle, to have a common centre linked with the 
government or the planning authority. 
None of this, of course, would entail interference in the actual 
administration of the individual units; basically, i t would merely mean 
the adoption of a concerted plan of action and common standards in certain 
areas of fundamental importance» 
One of these areas might be the handling of the sectorTs current 
resources» An interesting possibility along these lines would be the 
creation of one central government account for public enterprise funds 
so as to promote greater concentration of resources and greater f lexibi l i ty 
in their use. Under this system, which few Latin American countries have 
so far adopted, the cash receipts of all centralized and decentralized 
public institutions must be deposited in current bank accounts forming 
part of a single or central account administered by the Ministry of 
Finance. Consequently, the balance on the central account is equal to 
the sum of the balances in all the subsidiary accounts> and the Ministry 
can draw on a certain percentage of the accumulated total. In Chile;( 
where the system has been operating since 1959, the Ministry may draw up 
to 70 per cent. Both central and subsidiary accounts are with the Banco 
del Estado. 
The obvious advantage of a central government account is that 
better use can be made of the public funds, since i t prevents the kind of 




large surplus cash reserves in one enterprise, another is obliged to 
cut down i ts disbursements because i ts earnings are insufficient. It 
is important for the State to be able to transfer resources from enterprise^ 
with surpluses to those showing a deficit in two cases: f i rs t , to deal with 
any seasonal fluctuations- in the income and expenditure of public institutions 
and, secondly, in cases where an enterprise is permanently, or for long 
periods, generating substantial-cash surpluses. This, for instance, has 
been precisely the situation of Chile's Empresa Nacional de Petroieos for 
many years. 
The point should, however, be made that two fundamental conditions 
must be ful f i l led i f the central government account system is to work 
eff ic iently. First, a certain amount of programming is necessary to 
indicate the probable trend of the enterprises' cash balances, so that 
estimates can also be made - even i f only roughly and in accordance with 
the country's monetary policy — of the percentage of the combined balance 
on the central account to be drawn upon by the Ministry of Finance. 
Secondly, the commercial banks should not be allowed to use increases in 
the ceaatral government account reserves as a backing for larger loans to 
the private sector, since this would diminish the f lexibi l i ty with which 
* / 
the account can be used in the context of the over-all monetary programme. 
The opposite situation arises under the system of water-tight 
compartments, sometimes based on a variety of different wfunds" (Public 
Works Fund, Housing Fund, etc . ) where there is no possibility of transferring 
resources from one compartment to another, even on a temporary basis. A case 
in point is the operation of National Housing Fund (Fondo Nacional de l a 
Vivienda) in Uruguay in 1970, Established in 1969. and mainly financed 
out of a tax on wages and salaries, this Fund, which was to have started 
to develop a housing construction programme, last year accumulated unused 
reserves amounting to nearly 10 million dollars in value (about one eighth 
of Uruguay's total direct public investment); which were l e f t lying in 
banks and were one of the main reasons fer the shrinkage in the amount 
of money in circulation during that period. At the "same time, other priority 
sectors, such as transport, were suffering from an acute shortage of 
government funds which prevented enough money being invested to meet the 
country's needs» 
/3® . Integration 
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3» Integration for other purposes 
The opportunities outlined above may also arise in other more important 
spheres, which were dealt with in the section on the influence of the public 
sector. 
For example, prospects would obviously be brighter i f various forma 
of internal integration were applied to such fields as the promotion of 
local capital goods industries, capital goods import policies, and the 
adaptation and development of technology®, Naturally, whatever the present 
importance and, above al l , the future potential of the' principal public 
enterprises - even i f they operate independently —, would substantially 
increase i f procedures and instruments were established to co-ordinate 
policy. 
By and large, the various stages of this process and the methods 
employed closely resemble what has occurred in certain countries at the 
centre as a result of the emergence of conglomerates: and the subsequent 
decline in the importance of the old kind of monopoly or oligopoly. As 
in the case of conglomerates, the fundamental factor in the association 
or co-ordination of separate public enterprises is the existence and 
operation of a pool or joint fund of current and investment resources, 
administrative talent, and opportunities for developing and assimilating 
technological innovations. 
This is not, of course, tm advocate the creation of one vast public 
conglomerate. All that is intended here is to point out that the trend 
i s towards a greater co-ordination of Government enterprises, under any 
number of forma. 
km Function of the public enterprise sector 
There are two fundamentally different approaches to the sector's 
role and to i ts relations with private enterprise. According to one school 
of thought, the public enterprise sector is merely an extension of the 
State's* traditional responsibilities, dictated by circumstances, which 
does not affect the basic division into public and private sector. Seen 





the infrastructure and other basic services so as to Improve the performance 
of private enterprises. Moreover, when the State, for imperative reasons, 
must go further than this, such a situation is regarded as essentially 
transitory, pending the reversion to the private sector of any activities 
that play more than a supporting role. According to the other school of 
thought, the public enterprise sector should have broader and mere 
autonomous function, namely, that of becoming (in association with the 
central government) the motive force behind the expansion and orientation 
of the development process. 
It i s not for the author of this study to take sides. The situation 
as i t stands in Latin America today, presents a whole range of experiments 
in this f ield, with different methods, different emphasis, and with more 
or less lasting results, according to the case. One point that must be 
made, however, i s that, whatever the dominant approach may be, policy 
towards the sector must be faithful to, and consistent with, the formulation 
adopted, since ambiguities and contradiction® in the decision-making process 
may be far more harmful and have more far-reaching consequences than a 
leaning in one direction or the other. 
activities 
The question that has just been discussed is obviously bound up 
with another: the conflicting views about the expansion and diversification 
of the public enterprise sector, which are the reflection of the broad 
attitudes or schools of thought outlined in the previous section. For 
those that do not hold the traditional view, a move in the direction either 
of expansion or of diversification, apart from other justifications, would 
have the advantage of extending government operations to more profitable 
activities than in the past. 
Here, even more than before, i t is impossible to be absolutely 
abjective or strictly technical about the situation. The fact i s that 
. vexy few attempts have been made to do so and that the more traditional 
kind of approach is far more common. One exception to this rule is the 
study previously mentioned, which endeavours to draw a distinction between 




which must be government-run, and those intended or more suitable for 
private management. The author of this study points out that the industrie® 
composing the nucleus of economic expansion utilize a limited range of 
technology, with few innovations. Their range of activity i s relatively 
limited: certain services, electric energy, two or three kinds of coal 
and a few dozen petroleum, common steel and iron products. These sectors 
are assured of fairly easy access to the vast range of international 
know-how, either by ordering models, designs and specifications or 
through technical assistance. 
The industries in the second group, the author continues, arc? more 
numerous and produce every kind of article® Most of them employ a wide 
range of constantly evolving know-how often bound up with processes and 
equipment which are covered by patents or involve faci l i t ies that are the . 
exclusive property of international enterprises» In some cases, these 
innovations can only be introduced into the national economy by allowing 
the foreign enterprises that are the only possessors of the know-how into 
the country, while in others, i t entails the signing of sharing agreements 
2 9 / 
between the foreign and the national enterprises.—'L 
A number of objections can, however, be levelled against these views 
on the allocation of functions,, and not only on political and ideological 
grounds but also for a more important and less debatable reason: namely, 
the fact that the framework and functions of the private and public sectors 
also have their historical dimension, that i s to say that they change over 
time and according to circumstances or the stage of social development. 
To understand the situation properly, then, i t may be more useful to take 
into account the major changes that have occurred and their possible 
implications. 
Looking at the problem from this angle, i t would, for example, be 
helpful to bear In mind that, under the new or existing conditions of 
economic development in Latin America, the traditional idea of conflict . 
between the public and the private sector often no longer has any meaning® 
This i s due to the fact that from, the frequently - and especially in 
connexion with certain important basic industries that are leaders in 
technological progress — the real choice i s between public or send—public 
29/ See A. DfaaLeite, op. c i t . , , ; , /enterprise® and 
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enterprises and foreign or international enterprises. At the same time, 
there is the ©bvious fact that, in many Latin American countries, the 
expansion and diversification of the State enterprise sector — far from 
being an obstacle to private enterprise or competing against i t ~ has 
definitely^ had the effect of helping the private sector to extend i t s 
operations. 
Of course, this does not mean that the various problems inherent 
in the management of public enterprises should be overlooked? these are 
amply illustrated by the discussions that have taken place both in 





ARGENTINA! OPERATION OP THE LARGEST PUBLIC ENTEHPBISES; FINANCIAL BESULTS, 1969 
(Millions ef pesos) ' 
Current Income Current expenditure Oper- Capital expenditure Capital income 













ment b / 
Amor-
t i zat ion 
Total Over-all surplus Loans Other 
Manufaoturing 
14.8 Industrias Mecánicas del Estado (XKB) 10 298.H 10 563.5 1 917.6 8 339.5 10 317.6 -19.2 59.0 - - 59.0 245.9 -
Talleres de Reparaciones Navales (TAHEÑA) 958.9 1 050.2 708.5 307.I 1 070.0 -111.1 289.8 - I6.O 305.8 -I9.8 47.9 45=8 
Astil leros y Fábricas Navales del 
324.0 324.0 491.0 Estado (AFNE) 4 319.0 4 681.0 1 815.O 2 375.0 4 190.0 129.0 - - - -
Dirección Nacional de Industrias Estatales 14 009.I 5 085.2 1 342.8 1 971.O 3 874.6 375.8 335.2 982.O 64.0 1 38I.2 1 210.6 179.8 198.5 
Sociedad Mixta Siderurgia Argentina 69 765.5 72 226.7 • • • • • • 57 684.3 12 081.2 7 048.5 15 I80.0 1 262.9 23 491.4 14 542.4 • • • 4 n „ 9 
Mining 
65 785.0 2 356.O Yacimientos Petrolí feros Fiscales 214 137.0 214 137.0 37 867.0 105 648.0 148 352.0 65 785.0 67 890.0 14.0 12 922aO 80 826.O -
Cas del Estado 53 598.0 54 697.O 10 189.0 24 470.0 45 750.0 7 848.0 15 ¿95.0 - 13 444.0 29 I39.O 8 947.0 14 644.0 •• 
Yacimientos Carboníferos Fiscales 2 230.6 2 593.3 2 282.4 2 894.0 5 589.8 -3 359.2 814.4 441.5 215.7 1 483.4 2 996.5 - 36.4 
Transport and 'related a c t i v l t l e s 
Empresa Líneas I&rítiraas Argentinas (EIMA) 22 177.1 22 386.6 7 763.5 13 580.5 22 331.9 -115.3 2 720.0 - 698.6 3 832.6 54.7 - 212.3 
Empresa Flota Fluvial del Estado 
348.9 -996.1 Argentino (EFFDEA) 5 964.8 6 228.3 3 951.6 2 715.O 7 224.4 -1 259,6 25,6 - 323.3 - 206.7 
Administración General de Puertos 7 O63.5 7 217.3 3 710.1 1 477.9 5 253.2 1 860.3 1 325.6 - 52.1 1 377-7 1 964.1 - 13.4 
Transportes de Buenos Aires 409.0 409.0 79.5 65.5 288.2 120.8 - - 26.1 26.1 120.8 - -
Empresa de Ferrocarriles Argentinos 80 630.0 83 300.0 86 270.0 25 060.0 119 310.0 -33 590.0 17 000.0c / - 20 OOOeOç/ 37 000.0 -36 010.0 7 000.0c/ 800.Oc/ 
Subterráneos de Buenos Aires 3 051.5 3 051.5 2 381.8 760.0 3 201.4 -149.9 595.6 - 267.5 863.1 -149.9 - 3O.9 
Aerolíneas Argentinas 24 019.0 24 523.0 8 380.0 14 810.0 25 260.0 -271.O 355.5 600.0 3 634.1 4 589.6 -737.0 - 75.7 
Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones 48 066.6 52 869.5 24 395.3 5 769.6 33 344.6 17 735.1 24 600.4 - - 24 600.4 19 524.9 933.5 494.2 
Agua y Energía Eláotrloa 38 260.0 38 718.1 12 436.3 11 568.8 25 019.3 13 277.5 26 380.9 1 175.I 2 755.4 30 625.7 13 698.8 3 960.6 l 463,0 
Servicios Eléctricos del Gran Buenos Aires ... ... ... ... ... • • • 27 745.0 -613.0 7 726.0 34 858.O 215.5 13 307.Od/ 
Souroes Seeretaria de Estado de Haoienda, Dlreocidn Naoional de Programaoitfn Presupuestaria, Desenvolvlmlento de Egresos del Estado, ano 1969. Informe a l Cuarto T rime s i r s , Buenos Aires , March 1970. 
&/ Dlfferenoe between Income from sales of goods and services , and expenditure on wages and salar ies , soc ia l security , purchase of raw materials, equipment, services and interest payments. Only 
inoone from sales was considered so as to eliminate subsidies and other current transfers that might d i s t o r t the results f o r the actual operation of the enterprise, 
b / Purohase of capital goods, f inancial Investment and increases on stooks. 
0 / Estimates, based on data, from various sources. 
§ / Includes 238 million pesos in the form of government contributions* 
Tl & OQ œ 
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Table B 
BRAZIL: CONSOLIDATED ACCOUNTS OP SELECTED PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, BY SECTOR, I960 AND 1965 
(Millions of new cruzeiros) 
Current inoorae Current expenditure 
Seotor a / Year Operating 




Operating Other Fixed Financial 







I960 10.2 1 0 . 3 2.5 7 .5 2.7 3.4 0 .2 4,2 
; 1965 204.1 204.2 42.3 3 0 . 6 1 0 6 . 7 97.4 - 49.7 1.7 56.6 
Steel S i960 1 1965 
30.5 
415.1 





1 0 5 . 2 
2 5 . 0 
3 7 2 . 8 
5.5 
42.3 _ 




1 3 . 2 
465.6 





1 9 O I . 3 
5.0 





8 . 9 
1 4 3 . 0 
0.2 
















2 3 . 0 
6.4 
63.9 
- 1 . 0 
- 9 . 6 -
1 . 7 







1 2 2 . 6 
Q.7 




8 . 0 
0 . 3 
7 0 . 0 
0 . 3 
5 2 . 6 -
7 .0 
1 1 2 . 1 
0.2 
316.4 
7 . 9 
428.4 
Transport 
i960 2 6 . 5 ?9.1 29.7 1 0 . 6 57.5 -31 .0 21.5 7 .1 - 1 0 . 3 
1965 345.3 393.8 418.8 1 0 6 . 8 757.8 -412.5 36O.7 79.7 0.2 77.7 
Communications i960 1 1965 
2.4 






2 . 3 
11.0 
1 1 5 . 9 
- 8 . 6 
-83.9 -
0 . 8 
13.1 -
• • • 
Supplies ì i960 1 1965 
• • • 
7.5 
• • • 
9.7 
• • • 
3.2 0 . 2 6*3 
• • • 
1 . 2 
• • • 
1 . 8 -
• • • 
- 4 .9 
Source: Fundaj3.o Oetulio Vargap, Instituto Brasileiro de Economía, 
a / See attaohed l i s t of the enterprises considered.in eaoh sector , 
b / Excluding contributions and subsidies, which appear under "Other income". 
0 / Inoluding sco ial seourity contributions. 
d / Difference between inoome from operations and to ta l ourrent expenditure. It was not possible to separate operating from other expenditure in the lat ter f igure , 
e / Contributions and subsidies reoeivad under the head of ourrent ineome-
S/ Includes, in addition to f ixed and f inancial investment, changes in stooks, which in I965 had a negative sign in e l e c t r i c energy, transport and supplies. 
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Table B (Conci.) 
BRAZIL: LARGEST PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, BY SECTOR 
Mining and steel 
Companhia de Ajos Espeolals Itabìra 
Companhia Perro e Ago de Vitoria S.A. 
Companhia Siderurgica Nacional 
Comparitila Siderurgica Paulista 
Companhia Vale do Rio Dooe 
Usinas Siderúrgicas de Minas Gerais S.A. 
Chemical 
Companhia Nacional de Alcalis 
Petroleo Brasl&elro S.A. 
Poed supply 
Companhia Brasileira de Alimentos 
Companhia Braslleira. de Armazenagem 
Frigoríficos Nacionales 
Manufacturing and other 
Fábrica Nacional de Motores 
Empresas del Paírimonio Nacional 
Companhias Usinas Naclónals 
Transporte and communloatlons 
Rade Ferroviaria Federal 
Lolde Brasile1ro 
Administrapao do Porto do Rio de Janeiro 
Servipo de Navegapao da Baoia do Prata 
Servido de Navegajao da Amazonia 
SerVipo de Navegapao do Porto de Pará 
Companhla Nacional de Navegapao Costeira 
Servlpos Transporte Bala de Guanabara 
Z»na F.runoa de Manaus 
Eleotrlo energy 
Centráis El¿tricas Brasileiras 
Central Ele'trioa de Fumas 
Companhla Eleotrlcidade do Anapá 
Companhia Hldroelitrioa de Sao Francisco 
Companhia Hidroelátrloa Vale du feralba 




COLOMBIAs OPERATION OP THE LARGEST PUBLIC ENTERPRISES; FINANCIAL RESULTS, 
(Thousands of pesos) 
























Empresa Colombiana de Productos 
Veterinarios 15 973 3 571 1 295 5 690 10 283 20 625 _ -782 780 20 623 18 207 - 340 18 547 
Cementos Boyaoá S.A. 39 4l8 8 386 9 928 29 781 9 637 - - -237 -3 262 -3 499 • • • ... ... 
Industria de Concreto 
"INCO" Ltda. ti 435 410 763 1 246 189 -19 58 39 55 - ... 55 
Empresa Colombiana de Petróleos 1 306 409 220 876 128 584 1 059 803 246 606 » 83 350 -30 794 181 296 233 852 452 868 98 160 30 631 58I 659 
Transport and communloatlons 1 
Compañía Nacional de 
Navegación 12 951 4 152 3 183 13 348 -397 1 000 • • • -364 4 188 4 824 • 0 9 ... • • • • • • 
Empresa Puertos de Colombia 346 538 235 32I 5 0 67 262 500 84 038 10 000 46 099 -1 958 6 285 60 426 100 O32 47 810 147 842 
Corporación Industrial 
Aeronáutica 2 514 2 090 1 030 4 036 -1 522 1 000 1 800 1 990 4 790 • • • 1 3I9 525 1 844 
Empresa Colombiana de 
Aeródromos 39 050 32 253 _ 41 747 -2 697 111 706 25 846 -2 155 103 135 500 112 791 « 17 125 129 916 
Ferrocarriles Nacionales 333 880 278 524 94 428 4oo 44^ » -66 564 170 342 118 927 -13 830 -45 235 230 204 I94 684 . - 22 591 217 275 
Empresa Nacional de Teleco-
municaciones 459 598 24o 485 23 884 311 635 147 963 48 620 21 000 -IO9 794 , 11 242 -28 932 33 682 5 254 76 180 115 116 
Instituto Colombiano de 
Energía Eléctrica f / 1 287 5 957 521 9 791 -8 504 231 189 358 503 -815 22 230 611 107 765 385 12 615 32 592 810 592 
Instituto de Meroadeo 
Agropecuario g / 
1 
699 476h/ 58 890 1 672 76 253 623 223 17 610 170 811 -5 752 8 238 190 907 887 758 10 098 - 897 856 
($3 O 
<D S 
H H O 
Souroe: Contraloria General de la Reptfblioa, Informs Flnanolero de 1966» 
a / Income from sales of goods, products and services only» 
b / All expenditure on wages and salaries, sooial security and other special allowances. 
^ o / Only purchase of materials and supplies was considered. 
L^ d / In addition to wages and salaries!and purohase of materials, Includes the general expenses of the enterprise, exoept depreciation, and interest payments. 
^ e / Income and expenditure that could'not be plaoed under any other headings income includes currant income, rents, reimbursements and othsr capital resources, etc ; expenditure Includes depreciation 
and interest payments* " 
° XJ The Instituto de Energia Ellotriea doss not produce energy, but carries out studies, builds irrigation, drainage and hidraulio works f o r e lectr i f i cat ion purposes and constructs hydro- and 
thermo-eleotrio plants. 
g / This Institute is responsible mainly f o r regulating foreign trade in agricultural products and controlling the prices of those products on the national markets through the regulation of supply 
and the accumulation of stocks» ! 
h / Includes 631 767 000 pesos f or sales of goods which is not just i f ied or explained by any opposite entries under operating 1 
s 
Table B 
CHILE: OPERATION OF THE LARGEST PUBLIC ENTERPRISES; FINANCIAL RESULTS, 1?68 
(Hlll lons o f e30ud08) 



















Total e / 
Government 
contribu-
tion f / 
Loans 
Transport and oommunloatlons 
Empresa Portuaria I I3 .7 124.8 119.2 32.5 153.3 7.9 - 8.3 -28.5 55.1 - -3.6 -14.7 
Empresa Karítima del Estado 29.3 49.8 ' 26.0 41.1 67.1 6.1 - 6.3 -17.3 24.1 - - -0.5 
Línea Airea Nacional I39.6 175.8 64.2 90.0 186.5 178.5 25.4 203.9 -10.7 40.2 177.6 -9.3 6.1 
Ferrocarriles del Estado 313.8 378.0 457.8 177.7 663.I 132.7 0.6 I33.3 -285.I 337.4 26.4 26.3 28.3 
Empresa de Transportes Coleotlvos 
46.9 del Estado 51.5 54.9 36.2 91.1 2.9 - 3.1 -39.6 43.8 - -0.3 -0 .8 
Empresa Naoional de Te1e0omunicaciones 33 . I 34.2 9 .7 9=1 23.7 22.9 2.7 43.8 10.5 28.9 5.0 - -0.6 
Industry 
Industria Azucarera Naoional (lANSA) 237.3 253.4 35.4 195.8 256.5 15.2 0.6 15.8 -3.I 34.8 21.7 -36.6 -1 .0 
Asti l leros líaritimos del Estado (ASMAR) 59.4 60.6 5 3 a 13.5 66.6 8.0 - 8,0 - 6 . 0 21.1 - -5.9 -1.2 
Fábrica de Materiales del Ejército (FAMAE) 22.0 22.3 13.6 12.4 27.0 2.0 -2.1 - 4 . 7 8.2 1.2 -2.4 -0.2 
Cotspafiía de Aoero del Pacíf ico (CAP) 1 / 1 046.4 1 O58.5 • • • • • • 820.4 71.0 ... • • • 238.1 • • • • • » • 
Minina 
Empresa Nacional de Hiñería (EHAMI) 521.4 527.9 67.7 400.6 480.1 46.6 107.? 154.7 47.8 72.6 33.1 -11 .1 12.3 
Energy and fuel 
Empresa Nacional de Eleetricidad (EMDESA) 276.8 28O.I 59.3 58.4 178.7 360a - 387.1 101.4 137.6 96.2 55.7 -3.8 
Bnpreaa Nacional de Petréleo (ENAP) 828.O 828.I 85.8 346.0 431.8 203.I 40.2 255.2 396.3 - 29.9 -57 .9 -113.1 
Petroquímica Chilena S.A. - - • - - 23.9 - 28.2 - 7.9 7.5 12.5 0.3 
Commeroe 
Empresa de Comercio Agrícola (ECA) 99.5 102.2 31.6 14.2 180.2 10.8 3.1 13.9 -78.0 56.6 37.0 - 7 . 1 5.4 
Services 
Empresa de Agua Potable 74.6 79.O 29.I 12.9 43.1 27.4 1.1 28.5 35.9 1.4 1.7 -11.9 1.4 
Soupoe:Kinlsterlo de Haolenda, Direocián de Presupuestos,Balance Consolidado del Sector Público de Cfalle, 
a / Apart from sales , Includes investment Income, Income under special laws, e t c . 
g b / Including soc ia l seourity payments. 
CD o/ Including also Interest on the public debt end other current expenditure, except transfer payments. 
t£j d / Capital formation, purohase of assets and f inancial investment, 
e / Including other capital expenditure. 
£ / Including both current and capital contributions from the Government. 
ago 1968 y período 1964-1968. Santiago, Chile, 1970. M 03 \ 
§ / Including current contributions by other inst i tut ions , of which only that the ^ ^ 
Ferrooarrlles del Estado Is of any s i ze , current transfers to the private ^ • 
seotor and current and capital transfers to the public sec tor . o vO \ 
h / Variations in sash reserves, sale o f assets , self-generated income and other co 
inoome. ¡y> 





MEXICO: LARGEST PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, BY SECTOR, I968 
Capital stock Proportion of 
f „ \ State ©wiershii («Billions of pesos) ( p e r ô a n t a g e ) 
täniBä 
Compañía Minera de Guadalupe S.A. a / 
Compañía Minera La Florida de Muzquiz S.A. a / 
La Perla, Minas de Fierro S.A. a / 
Mexioana de Coque y Derivados S.A. b / 
Petroleum 
Petróleos Mexioanos . . . ••• 
Diesel Nacional S.A. h/ 250.0 100 
Hanufaoturlna 
Industria Petroquímica Nacional S.A. 100.6 100 
Tetrateild de Máxioo S.A. d / 50.0 0 / 
Altos Hornos de Máxioo S.A. 600.0 . . . 
Compañía Industrial de Atenquique 7°.0' ••• 
Compañía Industrial de Ayotía b / 17.0 0/ 
Constructora Nacional de Carros de Ferrocarril S.A. 80.0 96 
Chapas y Triplay S.A. b / 2.0 o / 
Empacadora Ejidal 2.5 96 
Zinoamax S.A. 63.5 100 
Fábricas de Rapel Tuxtepeo S.A. 160.0 o / 
Compañía Real del Monte y Baohuca 10.6 100 
Fertilizantes del Istmo S.A. b / 270.0 0/ 
Guanos y Fertilizantes de México S.A. 10.0 51 
Henequen del P&oífioo S.A. 0.6 83 
Hules Mexioanos S.A. 87.5 60 
Industrial de Abastos S.A. 60.0 51 
Industrial Eléctrica Mexicana S.A. 12.0 100 
Ingenio Independencia S.A. b / 25.0 0/ 
Ingenio Rosales S.A. 65.0 . . . 
Ingenio San Franoisoo El Naranjal S.A. b / 50.0 0/ 
Maderas Industriales de Úuintanardo S.A. b / 8.0 100 
m í z Industrializado S.A. b / 19.6 100 
Operadora Textil S.A. b / 10.0 0/ 
Productora e Importadora de Papel S.A. 7.5 60 
Slderárgloa Naolonal S.A. 100.0 0 / 
Sooiedad Cooperativa de Vestuario y Equipo S.A. 1.3 . . . 
Talleres Gráficos de la Naolón . . . . . . 
Talleres Tipográficos Nacionales 20.0 ' 100 
Inmobiliaria Bamfooo S.A. 6.7 o / 





/Table E (Cond.) 
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Table E (conclusion) 
Capital stock 




Transport and related aotlvitles 
Aeronaves de M&cioo S«A. 
Aeropuertos y Servicios Auxiliares 
Caminos y Puentes Federales de Ingresos 
Ferrocarriles de Chihuahua al Pacífico 
Ferrouarrll del fecífioo S.A, 
Ferrocarriles Nacionales de México 
Ferrocarriles Unidos de Yucatán 
Servicios de transportes Elóctrioos 
Comisión Federal de Electricidad 
Compañía de Luz y Fuerza del Ceirtro S0A* e/ 
Compañía Hidroeléctrica Occidental 
Almacenes Nacionales de Deposito S.A. 
Cenasupo S.A. 
Agrl culture 
Beneficios Mexicanos del Café S.R.L. 
Unión Forestal de Jalisco y Colima S»A* t j 
Commeroe 







8 0 . 0 
1.2 
40.0 
9 2 . 0 
• • • 













Source: Seoretaría de la Presidencia, Direooión General de Inversiones Públicas. 
a/ The shares are owned by Altos Hornos de Méxioe S*A* 
b/ The shares are owned by Nacional Financiera S.A, 
0/ The State has interest* 
d/ The shares are owned by Petróleos Mexicanos* 
e/ The shares are owned fcy the Comisión ¡federal de Electricidad« 
f / The shares are owned by the Compañía Industrial de Atenquique* 




DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: LARGEST PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, 57 SECTOR, I968 
(Thousands of pesos) 
Enterprises of the State 
Enterprises Corporation 
(Corporación Dominicana de 






Of State force 




on raw from Net 
materials sales profits 
(1966} (1966) 
Hiñas de Sal y Teso 1 060 100 246 769.3 -730a 
Faloombrldge Dominioana 20 000 10 • . . ... 0 . • 
Petroleum 
Petrolera Dominicana 3 000 33 • • • • • • • . • 
Manufacturing; 
Dominicana Industria de Calzados 250 100 127 I98.O 595.6 75.0 
Fabrica de Aceites Vegetales 46? 100 80 3O8.I 498,8 >104.2 
Sacos y Tejidos Dominicanos (FASACO) i 425 100 266 484.7 1 741.0 47.2 
Sacos y Tejidos Dominicanos (Textil) 6 000 100 560 2 495.1 1 5P2.2 -937.5 
Sisal Dominicano 1 000 100 • •• • • • , . . . . . . 
Tenería FA-2 300 100 40 56.4 I26.5 -7O.5 
C.A. Tabaoalera 4 000 72 455 • 2 738.O 17 402.9 647.5 
Chocolatera Industrial 3 100 93 151 47.0 -6.0 
Fábrica Dominicana de Cementos 12 000 73 551 500.7 6 287.8 847.0 
Fábrica Dominicana de Dlsoos 50 97 7 3.7 16.6 -10.5 
Industria Licorera La Altagraoia 150 87 33 50.7 105.3 -75.0 
Industria Nacional de Ikpel 5 000 87 231 1 111.1 2 651.1 45» 5 
Pinturas Dominicanas 900 82 171 709.1 2 I6O.4 242 ol 
Industrial Leohora »400 96 53 309.8 389.1 -195o8 
Molinos Dominicanos 4 000 66 232 5 074.8 10 871.7 740.3 
Refinería Desal 46 loo . 31 13.5 • •• -43«! 
Industria Nacional del Vidrio 5 000 92 16? • • • 2 660.9 606.9 
Naolonal de Construcciones 1 OCX) 44 • • • ... 
Sociedad Industrial Dominicana 3 000 47 • •• » . * • •• . . . 
Ropas y Tejidos Dominicanos 400 24 • • • ... ... 
Mezcla Lista C.A. 500 18 • •• • • • . . . 
Industria de Asbesto Cemento 1 000 43 ... ... ... . . . 
Industrias Nljua 1 250 28 • • « • • • « •• 
Industria de Pltfstioos 500 4 • • • • • • 
Laboratorio Químico Dominicano 470 18 ... ... • •• 
Fábrica de Baterías Dominioana 100 26 • » • 126.7 234.I 14.5 
Planta de Re cauchado 300 41 • •• 99*6 296.5 -32.2 
Commeroe 
Atlas Commerolal Company 2 500 84 91 ••• 1 514.7 -117.9 
Carlbbean Motors 2 000 72 111 •• • 1 323*6 -142.3 
Domlnloan Motors 1 200 68 47 • •• 606.O -112.2 
Ferretería £1 ferino 60 75 9 31.8 -38.5 
Ferretería Read l 000 62 42 . . . 5OI.9 -I35.I 
/Table F (oonclusion) 
Tabi© P (conclusion) 
E/CN.12/872 
Page 113 
Enterprises of the State Authorized Proportion Labour 
foroe 
(June 1967) 
Expenditure Income Net Enterprises Corporation oapital of átate on raw from 
(Corporación Dominicana de stock ownership materials sal es profits 
Empresas Estatales - CORDE) (1967) (percent-age) (1 ?66) 
(1966) 
Sociedad Inmobiliaria 2 50b 100 10 135.7 I8 .O 
San Rafael 400 32 • • • 2 291.5 229.8 
Comercial Dominicana I50 13. • • • • • • • • • • » • 
Equipos de Construcción 1 000 36 • •• • • • 
Fomento Industrial, Mercantil y 
Agrícola 1 5OO 12 « • • « • • • • 
Radie Hin ISO 12 • • • • # • • • • • 9 • 
Transport 
3-328,0 Dominicana de Aviación 830 100 202 • •• 2 144.0 
Agrioui ture 
Consoroio Algodonero 1 000 100 811 • • • 417*9 «2 O77o2 






Other Total Operating D e D r 9 o i a t l o n N e t 
income income costs «»P«™«™™ profits 
Corporación Dominicana de l 
Electricidad 37 000.0 20 198.7 -98.2a/ 20 100*5 IX 906.8 2 357#2 5 836.4 
Corporación Azucarera 
Dominicana (currently 
Consejo Estatal de Azúoar) 140 000.0 80 274.6 1644.8 81919-4 7^ 360.3 5^20.9 2138,2 
Corporación Hotelera . . . . . . . . . • •• ••• ••• 
Source : Oficina Nacional de Planificación, Plataforma para el Desarrollo Económico y Social de la 
Re pública Dominicana (1968-1985)* and balance sheets of enterprises. 
e / Including operating deficit of Preservado ra de Maderas amounting to 100 000 pesos. 




VENEZUELA: LARGEST PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, BT SECTOR, 1?68 
(Thousands of bolívares) 
Proportion Income Net Tear of State Capital from 
Installed ownership 
(percentage) 
stook s&les profits 
W 
Mining 
Minas de Garbín de Lobatem C.A. 1950 ... ... ... c . 
Petroleum 
35 178 Corporaolón Venezolana del Petróleo i960 loo . 483 600b/ 179 072 
Instituto Venezolano de Petroquímica 1956 100 975 030b / 77 273 -29 4l8 
Manufacturinß 
Siderúrgica del Orlnooo (CVG) 1964 100 1 647 790 4l8 110 15 523 
Centrales Azucareras (CVF) 0/ 1959 ... 100 000 67 608 -4 181 
Aluminio del Caroní S.A. (CVG) 1967 50 do 000 27 797 .2 120 
Cementos Guayana (CVG) 1968 25 12 000 -11 
O.A. Pulpa Guayana (CVG) ... .. . ... 
Centro Simón Bolívar (CVF) 0/ 1958 ... 46o 000 21 294 9 310 
Instituto Autónomo de Diques y „ 
-1 731* Astilleros Nacionales 1947 100 34 7155/ 12 391 
Transport and related actlvltles 
C.A. Venezolana de Navegación (CVF) 0/ 1959 ••• 72 305 99 769 5 754 
Transportadora Marítima Venezolana C.A. i960 ... ... ... ... 
Puerto de Hierro S.A. (CVG) . 50 450 2 401 -
Línea Aeropost&l Venezolana 1958 • •• 323 6 2 5 b / 51 310 1 314 
Venezolana Internacional de Aviación (CVF) 0/ i960 ... 32 760 136 187 16 360 
Instituto Autónomo de Administración de 
1946 446 384 Ferrocarriles del Estado 100 2 105 - 1 0 502 
C.A. Gran Ferrocarril de Tachlra 1894 ... 11 200 ... ... 
C.A. Nacional Teléfonos de Venezuela 1965 100 400 000 287 790d/ 36 832 
Almadenes de Depósitos Agropecuarios C.A» 1962 ... ... ... ... 
C.A. Administración y Fomento 
£lóotri00 (CVF) 0f 1958 • •• 800 000 237 071 10 207 
Electrificación del Caroní (CVG) 1963 100 514 000 35 198 20 983 
Corporación Nacional de Hoteles y 
17 7 3 ^ -466 Turismo 1965 ... 90 084 
C.A. Hotel Guayana (CVG) 1967 86 7 146 - -
Souroet Annual reports of the Venezuelan Development Corporation (Corporaoidn Venezolana de Fomento - CVF) 
and the Venezuelan Corporation for the Development of Guayana (Corporaoldn Venezolana de Guayana - GVG). 
a/ Net profits for the financial year given In the balance sheets of the enterprises before deductions for 
sales tax, transfers to reserve funds and distribution of profits. 
b/ Government capital only. 
©/ Figure for 1967. 
d/ Budgeted. 
